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Lord of the Lemons:
Origins and Dynamics of State
Capacity∗
Thilo R. Huning† and Fabian Wahl‡
Abstract
To better understand the role of taxation in the emergence of states, this article presents an incomplete
contract model of an agricultural society in which information asymmetries cause inefﬁcient taxation, and
hence outmigration, uprisings, and rent-seeking, but also urbanization. We propose a geographic index of
information costs, observability, to test our model. Our case study is the Holy Roman Empire, which had
a relatively homogeneous institutional framework, state of technology, culture, and ethnic composition
across hundreds of observed states, for over 500 years. We ﬁnd a robust link between observability and
states’ tax capacity, their size, and their survival.
JEL Codes: O42 · D73 · Q15 · N93 · D82
Keywords: State capacity · principal-agent problem · taxation · Holy Roman Empire
What creates a successful state? Current economic debate has stressed the role of efﬁcient taxation
and administration.1 Despite disagreements about the role of the state for economic development,
there is consensus that some level of state capacity is essential to ensure basic public good provision
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(Acemoglu, 2005). There is debate about what allowed some states to establish this capacity while
others failed. Long-run studies point at the the self-reinforcing nature of state capacity2, and have
identiﬁed important structural changes around and after 1500, from the ‘military revolution’ to the
Industrial Revolution until the emergence of the welfare state3, all of which radically changed the
rules of development. When searching for the optimal point in history to study the development of
state ﬁnances, one has to study the period from just before until just after these structural changes,
in order to avoid going back to far in time.4 In this paper, we will trace hundreds of uniquely
homogeneous states that were arranged in a federation, the Holy Roman Empire (HRE), through
these radical changes, 1250–1789. We ﬁnd evidence for a mechanism that links observability
of (taxable) agricultural output to state capacity. This mechanism explains differences in state
development during the medieval period, but not afterwards.
Our argument is based on the idea that states emerged when there was agricultural output that
needed to be protected (see Bates et al. (2002); North et al. (2009) and more recently Dal Bó
et al. (2015); Boix (2015); Mayshar et al. (2015)). Some believe states emerged from tribal societies
realizing that security could be provided more efﬁciently in a central way (Bean, 1973). Tribal
societies therefore set-up a voluntary ’social contract’ (Rousseau, Hobbes) between the group
and a ’violence specialist’ (North et al., 2009, p. 20) who was granted the ’monopoly of violence’
(Weber, 1919). Others do not believe in a voluntary contract, but in states emerging from coercion
by a ’stationary bandit’ (Olson, 1993) stealing from his subjects.5
2Examples include Allen (2009); Findlay and O’Rourke (2009); Mokyr (2011); Dincecco (2015); Karaman and Pamuk
(2013); Ang (2015)
3These revolutions include the military revolution (Tilly, 1993; Diamond, 1999; Simms, 2013; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015;
Boix, 2015), urban revolution (Allen, 2009; Bosker et al., 2013; Voigtländer and Voth, 2013; Karaman and Pamuk, 2013; Boix,
2015; Abramson, 2017), the discovery of the Americas (Hoffman, 2011; Nunn and Qian, 2011; Simms, 2013; Hoffman, 2015),
the printing press (Rubin, 2014; Dittmar and Seabold, 2015), the Reformation (Cantoni, 2012; Cantoni et al., 2016; Dittmar
and Meisenzahl, 2017), the Enlightment (Mokyr, 2011), the Financial Revolution (Neal, 2015), the French Revolution and
its consequences (Acemoglu et al., 2011; Boix, 2015), nationalism (Anderson, 1983), and the expansion of public good
provision in general (Alesina and Spolaore, 1997; Bolton and Roland, 1997; Alesina et al., 1999; Goldin and Katz, 2009).
4The few studies concerned with the determinants of state capacity prior to 1500 AD are primarily those examining,
in the spirit of Diamond (1999) the impact of the different timing of the Neolithic revolution across the world on the
development of statehood (Borcan et al., 2016; Ang, 2015) or those focusing on differences in transparency of agricultural
output and the role of environmental circumscription in ancient states (Mayshar et al., 2017; Schönholzer, 2017). Fenske
(2014) analyses the role of different gains from trade due to differences in ecological diversity for state capacity in
pre-colonial Africa. Exceptions to this are Abramson (2017) and Ko et al. (2016). These papers analyze the determinants of
political centralization and state formation for very early periods or over a very long time (e.g. from the Middle Ages until
today) and, in this, are closely related to our paper in this.
5This view of an involuntary agreement is shared by ﬁgures as prominent as Marx and Engels, but also Tilly (1985).
See Fukuyama (2011, Ch. 21) for an overview. An addition to this argument is the circumscription theory by Carneiro
(1970). Carneiro noted that early states emerged predominantly in areas surrounded by infertile areas (such as deserts),
and assumed this provided a natural barrier against ﬂeeing from violent rulers.
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What both agree on is that this ’contract’, either voluntary or involuntary, exchanges violence
(protective or coercive) in return for taxation. Many authors have therefore stressed the role of the
former and view military technology as decisive for state development (see Tilly, 1993; Diamond,
1999; North et al., 2009; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015; Boix, 2015; Ko et al., 2016). Museums and
arsenals of historic tools, weaponry, and war records from most of human history have guided the
understanding of the role of the horse, the chariot, the canon, or general conscription for political
order. The other side of the contract, efﬁcient taxation, is less prominent, but understanding it
is decisive for modern development economists. At its core aspect is the quality of information
about taxable output. The weaker the information, the more our bandit would ﬁnd himself
between Scylla and Charybdis. Demanding an excess of taxes, he bites the hand that feeds
him. Demanding too little, less modest rivaling bandits will take his place. Free-riding and
false accusation of free-riding also threatens also the consent of those governed by a voluntary
contract. Both the voluntary and the involuntary contract suffer from the problem of asymmetric
information between the source of the taxes and the provider of ’security’. From the perspective
of a peasant who is overtaxed due to false information, the distinction between these two origins
of a state is, therefore, of purely theoretical nature.
In addition, overtaxation will lead rational agents to hide some parts of the harvest (and spend
effort trying to avoid being caught), just to prevent starvation. States can try to reduce information
asymmetries by creating a political order, a hierarchy, to collect data on agricultural output. This
introduces multiple principal-agent problems and the problem of rent-seeking (Krueger, 1974;
Olson, 2008; Acemoglu and Robinson, 2012). Therefore, imperfect information about taxable
agricultural output translates to high information costs, undermines political institutions, may
lead to conﬂict within a state, reduces state capacity, and in the end limits the states development
in general—and precisely because of the information asymmetry, this is true even with the most
benevolent ruler. Unlike winners of wars, rent-seeking tax collectors, lords, and ofﬁcials did not
boast about their successes. Their relics seldom survived in a form to anything that could be
excavated today and analyzed in a structured fashion today. However, state capacity in an early
agricultural society has to be viewed as an equilibrium solution between military technology and
taxation.
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To formalize this argument, we develop a macroeconomic model that links state capacity to
geographic circumstances, namely a combination of the quality, and observability of agricultural
output. This model is inspired by the study of Mayshar et al. (2017), who develop a principal–agent
model of an agricultural state, in which state rulers maximize state revenue under information
asymmetry about agricultural output, which is geographically determined. If output is perfectly
predictable, rulers can extract full effort from their subjects. In a state with a high spatial variation
of soil quality, for example, the actual quality of a single plot is hard to observe, meaning the ruler
will have to estimate the endowment. The lower the observability of soil quality, the lower the
state capacity. The more heterogeneous, and thus less observable the productive potential of each
plot, the higher the costs of observation.6
Our theoretical model extends the work of Mayshar et al. (2017) in respect to respects. Their
model is not empirically testable as they only distinguish between two types of soils, those with
low and those with high observability and provide only two case studies from ancient times. We
generalize their micro-level principal-agent model to a macro-level two-sector output model with
a continuous observability measure. We also extend their model to explain the failure and survival
of feudal states and the changing importance of agricultural and economic determinants of state
capacity over time.
To test our theoretical propositions empirically, we compute a variable that proxies the observability
of agricultural output (and thus the information costs in an agricultural society). This measure
is based on spatial variation of the crop suitability within a region. Output is measured using
the average caloric yield that can be obtained from harvesting crops. We base our measure of
observability on the caloric suitability index developed by Galor and Özak (2014, 2015). This index
denotes the amount of calories that can be produced in a given area, averaging over the individual
caloric yields obtained from planting all suitable crops. This index covers the periods before and
after the Columbian exchange. Based on this index we calculate our observability measure as
a ruggedness index of caloric yields, i.e. we measure the variation in agricultural output as the
variance between the caloric suitability of each cell and that of its neighboring ﬁelds. Thus, we
6Our reasoning is also based on the fact that medieval rulers, for example Charlemagne, were not only interested
in increasing agricultural output, but also in increasing its observability, uniformity and comparability (Henning, 1994;
Hermann, 1985)
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capture to what extent the agricultural output of a grid cell diverges from perfect observability
(all cells within a grid have the same caloric yield).
We link this observability measure to the states in the HRE at six points in time (1250, 1378, 1556,
1648 and 1789), which are all decisive moments in Central European history (see p. iii of the
Appendix). This allows us to abstract from the role of military technology, as this is common
across our sample and has been studied extensively. We obtain information and states and their
size by digitizing historical maps of the HRE (without the Italian parts) by Wolff (1877). After
digitizing these maps, we validated and, if necessary, corrected them using literature on the history
of territorial states in the HRE, such as Köbler (1988) and Sante (1964). We also collected reasons
for the failure of states.
Using this unbalanced, state-level panel data set, we ﬁrst show a robust and both economically
and statistically signiﬁcant positive relationship between observability of agricultural output and
taxation. We proxy the taxation by the tributes towards the Empire, the ’Reichsmatrikel’. We then
investigate how differences in observability are related to the failure or survival of agricultural
states. The results suggest that states with low observability are more likely to disappear because
of bankruptcy or war and that observability is positively linked to the probability of state surviving
in the Middle Ages. In the following, we ﬁnd observability being positively related to state size
when pooling over all states and periods. The relationship also holds when estimating separate
cross sections for each of the six years and when considering the characteristics of neighboring
states. It is also robust to controls for many alternative determinants of state capacity, such as
access to trade routes and rivers; the availability of important natural resources such as iron, gold
or salt; trade fairs; imperial cities; terrain features such as ruggedness and elevation, temperature,
suitability for ploughing; the type of the state (i.e. kingdom, duchy, princedom, county, city etc.);
the number of battles per state area; and the effect of differences in the appropriability of crops.
Results pass various tests of robustness. We use the settled area of a state as dependent variable
(the area that is not forested or marshland or the like). We take levels of agricultural observability
and state area instead of natural logarithms. We employ an alternative version of the agricultural
observability index (based on the assumption that only the crop with the highest caloric yield is
planted), and another version of the index. The cross-sectional estimates, and alternative OLS
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regressions in which the agricultural observability index is interacted with period dummies, are
in line with our theoretical reasoning and historical evidence. Agricultural observability loses its
signiﬁcance as a determinant of state capacity in the early modern period, more speciﬁcally in
the 16th century. As outlined earlier, this is the timing we would expect, when due to structural
changes like the Reformation and technological progress in military technology made the scale
effect the dominant factors in predicting state capacity.
Below we provide an overview of relevant historical features, such as the political and societal
structure of the HRE. We continue by developing the theoretical model that connects the principal-
agent problem to state capacity and size. We introduce the data and outline our empirical strategy
to test the theoretical model. This includes a discussion of alternative inﬂuences on pre-modern
state capacity, and also how we address them. We will discuss the empirical results, and then
conclude
I. State Size in an Agricultural Society
MT,MW
A
MW MW
′
MT
A∗A∗
′
Figure 1: Stylized equlibrium area (A∗) of a state
in equilibrium between decreasing marginal costs of
warfare, MW, and increasing, geographically induced
and non-linear marginal cost of taxation MT, before
and after the military revolution that shifts military
costs to MW ′ starting around 1500
We deﬁne a state as a geographical unit that
competes with fellow states over both terri-
tory and labor supply to generate taxes. We
are therefore interested in the tax capacity of
such a state, and its inﬂuence on geographic
size and survival. Our model state is pre-
dominantly agricultural, as this was by far
the leading occupation throughout human
history (see Allen, 2000, for estimates). We
assume that land rents are Ricardian, and
that a state’s tax revenue is a function of the
available land area and labor force. The gen-
eral idea that the geographic size of a state
is at equilibrium between increasing returns to scale in providing public goods and increasing
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obstacles to this provision 7 is well established (see Spolaore, 2014, for a recent overview). Consider
Figure 1. Following Bean (1973), we view defense of the territory as the predominant public good,
which is provided at decreasing costs per unit of land. During the High Middle Ages changes in
technology ampliﬁed these decreasing returns to scale, in the ’Military Revolution’ (Tilly, 1993;
Gennaioli and Voth, 2015; Boix, 2015).
Already Adam Smith was concerned with obstacles to state size and capacity, and proposed a mix
between geographic variables and administrative constraints
”In countries, such as Italy and Switzerland, in which, on account either of their distance from the principal
seat of government, of the natural strength of the country itself, or of some other reason, the sovereign came
to lose the whole of his authority. [...] This is the short history of the republic of Berne as well as of several
other cities in Switzerland. If you except Venice, for of that city the history is somewhat different, it is the
history of all the considerable Italian republics, of which so great a number arose and perished between the
end of the twelfth and the beginning of the sixteenth century.”8
Concerning distance, Olsson and Hansson (2011) have recently shown that across modern countries
there is a robust negative relationship between country size and rule of law.9 In theory, there
can be three reasons for their ﬁnding. First, the complexity of the process upon which that
information is collected (unrelated to distance). Second, the transfer of the information through
the organizational structure of the state (weakly related to distance, depending on circumstances).
Third, the loss of information due to the physical transport of the information, which we positively
rule out for modern times given communication technology.
Regarding the ﬁrst, more complex processes are harder to understand. Mayshar et al. (2017) show
this with Egyptian agriculture, a fairly simple process. The Nile carried with it fertile soil and
distributed it evenly across its banks. This means that a primitive tool, the Nilometer10 was a
reasonable indicator for harvest outcomes, in the form of a univariate relationship. By contrast,
agricultural output in Mesopotamia depends on multiple variables, as irrigation was more complex.
7Both Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Bolton and Roland (1997) view heterogeneous preferences as the obstacle for
modern states
8Wealth of Nations, book III, ch. 3. Quoted edition Smith (1991)
9They also provide an overview of the history of this thought including prominent ﬁgures like Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau,
and Montesquieu.
10A Nilometer is essentially a set of marks to measure the water level (see Mayshar et al., 2017).
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The process of agriculture in Western and Central Europe was even more complex, and not well
understood in the Middle Ages. There are some homogeneous landscapes, where properties of
the soil are very uniform, the terrain is even, the wind blows all seeds in the same direction, etc.,
and other landscapes, where none of this is true. Taxation of output from these landscapes will
naturally be based on estimates, and these can vary in their quality. Lacking an objective tool (like
the Nilometer), these estimates relied on self-reporting (van Schaïk, 1993; Vogeler, 2005). We will
outline how different levels of variation, which are geographically determined, yield different
qualities of information, and induce information costs.
Information about agricultural output is necessary for taxing an agricultural society. Meteorology,
the science of measuring and predicting weather and climate, was rediscovered during the
Renaissance. Behringer (1999) goes as far as viewing the emergence of meterology to predict
agricultural output as a counter-reaction to witch-hunting—the prevailing practice for overcoming
harvest failures during 1300–1600. We can assume that the state of meteorology was so weak, and
that investment into the understanding of factors that determine the harvest was so costly, that tax
collection depended on adaptive expectations, and also local gentry and ofﬁcials who were familiar
with subjects and landscape. This explains hierarchies, such as the Chinese bureaucracy, the
Mamluks in the Middle East, and also the feudal system in Western and Central Europe.11
Relying on local knowledge has downsides. In any such hierarchy there is loss of information,
even if the incentives of all participants are aligned. In an analogy to the telephone game, there
would be some loss of information, but driven more by the number of hierarchy levels than
distance.12 The levels of hierarchy in the HRE were however not dependent of its size, but mostly
due to tradition. This could lead us to reject incentive-aligned tax ofﬁcials if we observe variation
in state capacity despite the same number of levels in the hierarchy. At any level in the hierarchy
there is a principal-agent problem, and these problems combined limited the expansion of the
11It is important to note that the feudal system was not built from scratch, but relied on existing tribal hierarchies. The
alternative, demonstrated by China, reveals however that these structures could be eroded, if the central power is strong
enough. This in turn allows us to measure information costs half a millennium ago, unlike in other areas of the world.
One can assume that asymmetric information in a bureaucracy would translate to e.g. corruption, which is hard to observe
in a historical context. (see also Mitterauer, 2004; Fukuyama, 2011).
12Consider playing the telephone game. The quality of information is reduced slowly but continuously over time (as
people forget) which would be analogous to the distance in our context. Much faster, and the core of the game, is the
sharp drop in information quality between two players when one player has to listen and repeat the information.
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state.13 In the next section, we will trace these problems through the hierarchy of the HRE and
show how we can measure them in aggregate.
II. Taxation in the Medieval Holy Roman Empire
We follow the literature in regarding the medieval Roman Empire as a chain of bilateral contracts
(North and Thomas, 1971; Volckart, 2002), through which security is provided from the top down
in exchange for goods and services (see Bean, 1973; North et al., 2009; Olson, 1993). In Figure 2,
we see the ends of the chain of bilateral contracts held by the Emperor and the households. Our
element of interest, the territorial states, contracts directly with the Emperor, but only connects to
households through intermediaries. We will outline how the rents that gentry and ofﬁcials gain
from inter-mediating between state and household are a loss to the rulers, and how rents arise
endogenously from the multi-layer principal-agent problem.
1. Households and the Gentry
The lower end, and the smallest political unit of the HRE was the household (see (Wilson, 2016, p.
508) and (Volckart, 2002, p. 33)). Volckart (2002) distinguishes between three types of contracts
that exchange either services or agricultural goods between the household and the low gentry
and ofﬁcials. The most prominent of these was the feudal contract, in which a lord (lat. vilicus)
provides security in exchange for agricultural output and compulsory labor for the feudal lord
(corvee). The households had the right to decide the use of the land and the yields of the land
(“usus et usus fructus” (Volckart, 2002, p. 40)), but would never gain property over it. This system,
developed by the Carolingians, had its origins in the Late Roman Empire, when formerly free
peasants were obliged to ﬁll military granaries, and diffused eastwards into the Germanic areas
(Mitterauer, 2004, p. 42ff.). The lord maintains certain rights of deposition over the feudal state,
but grants the household (its serfs) the right to work on the land and retain a portion of the harvest
to feed themselves.
13The idea of non-aligned incentives in a company-like state, which is true both for a feudal society and a command
economy, is taken from Harrison (2002).
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Emperor
Territorial States
Gentry / Oﬃcials
(Partly Endogenous)
Household
Security
Security
Security &
’usus et usus fructus’
Tributes &
War Service
Tributes &
War Service
Agricultural Goods &
Services
Note: This graph shows how agricultural
output and security are exchanged via a
chain of bilateral contracts between the
household on the one side and the
emperor on the other side. The box
’Gentry and ofﬁcials’ represents multiple
layers of bilateral contracts exchanging
tributes & war services against the
promise of security
Figure 2: Model of the politi-
cal structure of the Holy Roman
Empire
Neither secular nor ecclesiastical states based their taxation upon
tradition, but were ﬂexible about the form and quantity of taxa-
tion. North and Thomas (1971) have argued that whether a lord
would demand goods or services was a question of transaction
costs, and depended on the lord’s ability to market each of the
products. We employ this idea in our model, since we identify
all forms of taxation with their labor input. Inefﬁciency in ac-
quiring information about the harvest posed a substantial risk
to the lord. Tradition and written contracts certainly did not
impose an upper bound for taxation, especially due to a very
ﬂexible and hence dynamic element: free provision of peasants’
labor services. Labor services were not well codiﬁed (Volckart,
2002, p. 9), and allowed rulers to ﬂexibly adjust the quantity of
such services to circumstances. For example, a 1222 source from
the Eiffel provides instructions on how to persuade peasants to
take over new duties, selling them as old traditions (Epperlein,
2003, p. 76).14
One of the most important threats to tax capacity was outmi-
gration. Depending on the demographic circumstances, but
especially following the Black Death, outmigration to another feudal state or a Free or Imperial
city made states compete for peasants (Volckart, 1997, 2002), and one element of this competition
was costs created by incomplete information.15 Rulers’ ability to restrict this migration depended
on features such as state capacity and the size of its territory—as it was easier to escape undetected
from a small state than a large one (Blickle, 2006; Gerteis, 1997). Thus, some rulers were more
14Large and extensive corvees were not unusual (see e.g., the discussion in Blickle (2006) on the particularly repressive
feudal system in the Baltic Sea area).
15The migration from rural areas to cities is considered among German historians to be an important aspect in the
demise of the feudal system. They provide a several detailed accounts about conﬂicts between rulers and city states about
ﬂeeing serfs. One of the most conﬂicted topics between territorial states and cities states was the so-called urban dwellers
(“Pfahlbürger”): people who lived outside the area of the city in villages but were citizens of the city—and hence not part
of the feudal system. Emperors forbade this type of citizenship several times during the 14th century but did not succeed
in preventing it (Blickle, 1988). However, as emphasized by (Ogilvie, 2007, 2011) urban labor markets in pre modern times
were highly regulated by guilds, and they often successfully limited immigration to cities. Thus, migration to a city state
might not have been possible for everyone or at all times.
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successful in preventing emigration than others.16
Another threat arising from information asymmetries and information costs was revolt. Peasant
revolts were common in the HRE throughout the Middle Ages and increased in frequency and
intensity in the early 16th century, culminating in the German Peasants’ War in 1525.17 Although
their overall success (especially in the Peasants’ War) was limited, there are numerous examples of
peasant revolts against (perceived) overtaxation, restriction of free movement and inheritance rules
that resulted in a compromise between the ruler and the peasants. These gradually improved the
situation of the peasants and weakened the feudal system in the long-term.18
Incomplete information about agricultural output also explains a common phenomenon during
the Middle Ages, tax avoidance. The Sachsenspiegel (around 1230)19, a rich historical source of
medieval life in Saxony, allows us to understand how peasants attempted to cheat their rulers. It
explicitly states that the quality of the tithe (an in kind payment to the local church ofﬁcials of ten
percent of the agricultural harvest of the season) has to be exactly the same as the share the peasant
keeps (2nd book, Art. 48 §6). Rulers had to be informed about the estimated quantity of the
harvest in advance, otherwise they could make their own estimate of their subjects’ dues.
2. Gentry and Nobility
The intermediate level of the feudal societal order there was the gentry, i.e. lower-ranked nobles
like knights, ofﬁcials (“Ministerialen”) of the noble state ruler (like reeves) and also those counts
and barons who ruled over a feudal estate that was not “reichsunmittelbar” (directly subordinate
to the Emperor) but was given to them by a duke or prince. Those medium ranked nobles (the
gentry) usually administered their territory under a higher-ranked noble. For example, counts
originally served as vassals of dukes with responsibility for a particular county of the duchy.
16In the south west of the HRE, rulers found arrangements to deal with it, either by demanding several types of fees and
compensation payments for permission to emigrate or by bilateral agreements with neighboring rulers that for each serf
migrating to the territory of the neighbor they get one of the neighbor’s serfs (Blickle, 2006). In the north, by contrast, they
took measures to further punish migrants in order to restrict emigration, e.g. they made agreements with other rulers to
send back strangers from other states who didn’t have a an ofﬁcial dismissal allowance from their former ruler–but with
apparently limited success (Blickle, 2006; Peters, 1995).
17The reader is referred to Blickle (2006) and Buszello et al. (1984) for detailed accounts of the Peasants’ War.
18An overview of the history of German peasant revolts and uprisings in general, including several case studies is given
by Blickle (1988, 2006) and Franz (1976).
19Cited after Epperlein (2003).
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As such, they were responsible for the collection of dues and taxes in their feudal estate. These
intermediaries could engage in rent-seeking (North and Thomas, 1971; North et al., 2009), keeping
a certain amount for their own purposes and passing the rest to the overlord. They had to provide
soldiers for the wars of the overlord in return for his protection. Hence, the principal-agent
problem between them and the households discussed above, was relevant to the relationship
between the overlords and the gentry. If the gentry could not appropriate enough taxes from the
serfs (or overtaxed the households) the amount that the overlord received from the gentry was
also reduced. Furthermore, as the local gentry had better information about the agricultural than
the overlord, there is an additional principle-agent problem between gentry and nobility. The ﬁrst
has an incentive to cheat the nobility in order to retain a higher share of output for themselves. Of
course, the incentive to conceal tax revenues increases as agricultural output, and the amount that
is available for appropriation, decreases. This increases the severity of the principal-agent problem
between the nobility and the gentry.
Territorial states saw these intermediaries as necessary to collect taxes, but also as a cost factor,
aware that information asymmetries led to rent-seeking. As Bloch (1966, p. 134) wrote, the
emergence of absolutism was “to protect rural communities, ripe material for taxation, from
intemperate exploitation by their landlord”.
3. Emperor and Nobility
At the top of the feudal order was the Emperor of the HRE, who was usually also the king of
Germany. He was the supreme overlord and granted feudal estates to his vassals, the “Fürstliche
Häuser” (princely houses). This originally meant dukes, princes, bishops and archbishops. They
also had the right to ’subcontract’ parts of their estates to lower-ranked nobles for administration
(subinfeudation).20 The Emperor also granted city rights (making cities directly subordinate
to the Emperor), and had the right to reallocate estates from disloyal or deceased vassals. In
exchange for the feudal estate and troops for war and dues from the nobles (the ’Reichsmatrikel’)
he guaranteed security of their rights over the estate. The Emperor also had territories that he
20The fact that the vassals had the right to give away parts of their estates to lower-ranked nobles also led to a decrease
in the power of the Emperor over time. This was because, within the feudal hierarchy, a noble was subordinate only to his
immediate overlord and not to those at higher ranks.
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ruled directly. In those territories, the Emperor usually installed ofﬁcials like reeves to collect
taxes, administer the law and uphold order. Here again, the relationship between nobility and
Emperor was characterized by a principal-agent problem, and again, the initial information
problem between gentry and serfs determined the amount of dues, taxes and troops the Emperor
could extract from the nobility. Most of the time the nobility had a better bargaining position
than the Emperor as, especially during the Middle Ages, the Emperors did not directly control a
large area. Furthermore, the German king was traditionally elected by the leading princes (the
electors). Hence, he depended on the loyalty and favor of the most powerful territorial rulers. This
allocation of power between the princes and the Emperor lead to a decline in his power during
the medieval period and a decentralized, highly fragmented political landscape.21
III. Model
The purpose of the model is to connect information costs in a completely coercive society to tax
capacity, as in Mayshar et al. (2017), from there to connect the geographical size of rural states
and migration to cities. We will employ a two-sector model of agriculture and proto-industry.
To be consistent with the historical setting we will not allow for non-coercive institutions (see
Acemoglu and Wolitzky, 2011; Boix, 2015), and only a negligible share of agricultural output is
traded via markets (Ogilvie, 2001). We will outline a static analysis before turning to the system
dynamics.
The optimization problem of our states is very complex, so that we constrain ourselves to the most
simple notation, standard letters, omit explicit functional form, and explain our concepts mostly by
comparative statics.22 In general, states maximize tax revenue over an inﬁnite time horizon. They
aim to extract all of their subjects’ output above subsistence.23 They can do so by allowing their
subjects to move to cities, adjusting their urbanization rate u ∈ (0, 1). States can also conquer other
21The Golden Bull of 1356, the so-called constitution of the HRE, ofﬁcially settled the election procedure of the king by
the electoral college and conﬁrmed the rights and privileges of the electors. This made those seven (and later up to nine)
electors the most powerful rulers of the Empire.
22Consider any function f (x) that is differentiable twice. We will use a shortcut to ease notation using f (x ↑) if ∂ f∂x > 0
and f (x ↓) if ∂ f∂x < 0.
23The idea that the taxes were so high that peasants were kept at subsistence can be found both in Smith (1776) and
Malthus (1798), and is also a feature of Mayshar et al. (2017).
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states’ territories, which will affect their geographic size a, their average Ricardian land rent r, and
the observability of their agricultural output N. Attacking other territories and defending against
attacks come with adjustable costs V. States can also allocate parts of their budget to maintaining
interior order G. These costs include tax administration, but also collecting information on tax
cheaters, quelling uprisings, preventing subjects from ﬂeeing the state or moving around the
state against the state’s interest, acquiring subjects from over states, and rudimentary poor relief.
Decisions of state budgets and strategy are taken discretely for any year t. States have a common
discount factor δ > 0 so that the optimization is given by
max
u,a,r,N,V,G
∞
∑
t=1
(
Tt
(1+ δ)t
)
s.t. constraints
which are described in more detail now.
1. General Model of the Economy
We will drop state and period subscripts for ease of notation, wherever possible. Consider any
state that produces agricultural output R and output from proto-industry P, so that Y = YP +YR.
The state is endowed with common labor L, which is split between rural LR and urban LP
labor stock, depending on the urbanization rate u, LP = uL and LR = (1− u)L. Agricultural
output depends on common technology AR, factor inputs LR and soil S, which can be substituted
at elasticity α, so that YR = ARLR
αS(1−α). Output of the proto-industry depends on common
technology AP and manual work LP at diminishing returns β < 1, so that YP = APLP
β. There
is a common information technology AT ∈ (0, 1) to collect taxes and assess agricultural output.
States collect these taxes in the form of goods, or via direct labor services (North and Thomas,
1971; Volckart, 2002; Mitterauer, 2004). Subsistence in cities is higher than in the countryside as
cities do not produce food and transport is costly, sP > sR. Therefore, tax income T is a function
of TP(AT ↑,YP ↑, sP ↓). Subjects naturally prefer to live in cities (which we will show later).
We can therefore solve for the urbanization rate that maximizes tariff revenue, which is found
where the additional tax from a urban labor supply is offset by the loss from its higher costs of
subsistence and the loss to the rural labor supply, u( ∂YP
∂LR ↑,
∂YR
∂LP ↓, (sP − sR) ↓). States face costs
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V > 0 to protect their borders using common military technology AV .24 These costs increase
with geographic size a, but have decreasing marginal costs per area (Bean, 1973). The investment
in one period has consequences for the following periods. Castles need to be maintained, and
unemployed soldiers would ﬁnd employment as rowing bandits, so that Vt(AV ↓, a ↑,Vt−1) with
∂2V
∂2a < 0 and
∂Vt
∂V(t−1)
≥ 0. This explains that there will be some states which will maximize tax
revenue by minimizing the costs of defense, e.g. by building a wall around the city itself, setting
u = 1 and not having any endowment of soil S. These are city states.
2. The Problem of Agricultural Taxation
States having u < 1 use soil as an input factor. Following Mayshar et al. (2017), states have
incomplete information about soil quality and depend on estimates of agricultural output. There-
fore, the state will organize tax collection in its territory by building a hierarchy. This hierarchy
features distinct groups of households, which are groups of individuals. Rural households are
only connected to the state only via a set of individuals, the intermediaries. Any rural household
h is part of a set of households H that owes taxes to the tax ofﬁcial, or lord, g1 at the lowest level
of intermediaries l1, which contracts the land from. In this way, various layers on other layers
l2, .. various intermediaries g2, .. are interposed between the state and all its rural households H,
h ∈ Hl1g1 ⊂ Hl2g2 ... ⊂ H. Using adaptive expectations about the quality of the soil, the lords or
ofﬁcials parcel this land and assign it to rural households. They can assess average Ricardian
land rent r. However, the complexity of the weather affects ﬁelds in any period t in ways that are
beyond their understanding25, Sht = rh +ωht while limt∗→∞ ∑t
∗
t=0
∂Sht
∂ωht
= 0. Households naturally
learn about their current soil endowment as they harvest. Anyone else has to rely on incomplete
information about the soil quality. Using adaptive expectations26, the most local intermediary
24This argument is in line with coercion, or violence as the source of states, as in Olson (1993). Tilly (1993), North et al.
(2009), Gennaioli and Voth (2015) and Boix (2015) have based their arguments about the dynamics of state building on this
aspect.
25Imagine two farms, one on the hill, and one in the valley, and strong rain for days. The hill farmer will ﬁnd it sufﬁcient
to dig some temporary channels to help the excess water ﬁnd its way downhill; the valley farmer will ﬁnd his crops
ﬂooded.
26We can neglect Bayesian updating, mostly due to limitations on the tax collector’s learning behavior. How do
states learn about their subjects’ soil quality in any period? A scientiﬁc model of the link between weather, landscape
characteristics, and meteorology, was not available. States cannot learn from their subjects’ words, but they can learn
from what they observe, in the form of operant conditioning and social cognitive learning. If tax collectors observe an
unexpected increase in some households’ livestock, physical appearance, and living conditions in general, and increase the
tax, this learning is part of natural human behavior, and therefore common technology. Learning from peers, e.g. if some
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will allocate a plot of land to a household that maximizes tax revenue, depending on the average
rent and the subsistence level, ah(rh ↓, sR ↑) as it cannot be optimal to keep the households below
subsistence. This will not assure that households never starve, as the effects of the weather upon
a speciﬁc plot are unobserved to the anybody but the household, which is not trusted to share
the information. Generalizing this point, due to the principal-agent problem on each layer, all
layers from the lowest gentry l1 up to state level n depend on own estimates. We assume that any
level’s signal about soil quality S∗ is normally distributed around the actual endowment of rural
household h with soil S in period t. The shape parameter N represents noise (a decrease in the
quality) of the signal. From standard reasoning about information asymmetries back to Akerlof
(1970) it follows that the signal gets weaker the further up the hierarchy, so that for any level k
it is ∀k={,1...,n} : S∗lkht ∼ N
(
Sht, N
li
h
)
while ∀k={1,...,(n−1)} : N
l(k+1)
h ≥ Nlkh . Any level k will however
use this signal as the basis for taxation of household h and wish to leave all levels below it with
subsistence only, TRlkht (Y
∗lk
ht ↑, sR ↓).
What are the consequences of underestimating the soil endowment? Since S∗ht < Sht it follows
that some of the agricultural output cannot be taxed away. If the signal of the lowest level
of intermediaries underestimates the soil endowment, this yields a potential rent y for the
households, yl1ht(S
∗l1
ht − Sht) with
∂y
l1
ht(
S
∗l1
ht −Sht
) ≥ 0. This potential rent will be realized by rational
agents depending on the probability of being caught cheating and the punishment (following
the logic of Becker, 1968). Prosecution of households often ended with subjects being injured
and dying, such that prosecution could reduce the supply of labor in the next period. If chances
of being caught are high rural households will reduce their effort during the harvest, leading
to a reduction in L. Lords also had the right to punish ’insubordination, persistent laziness,
or deliberate neglect of their duties’ (Whaley, 2012, p. 251), so that this labor reduction was
also risky. In any layer, intermediaries therefore have the incentive to keep their agents from
realizing rents, and hold on to them themselves. In the long run, it has different effects on
the society who is the one extracting rents, but for the tax capacity of the state, it has only
intermediary ﬁnds out that another intermediary on the same level is richer than he is, the ﬁrst intermediary might try to
discover the reason. This might help to identify the households that cheat him based on shared characteristics with the
households that his richer peer taxes more efﬁciently. He will do what his neighbor does, e.g. provide his tax collectors
with better tools to assess, inﬁltrate his subjects with spies, etc. Soon, all intermediaries on this level will discover the trick,
and the technology will become common. Tax collectors could try to learn by trial and error to retrieve a model on the
effects of weather and taxation on what they can observe. As this is connected to starvation, out-migration, and uprising,
these experiments would be very costly.
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negative ones.27. The same principal-agent problem is repeated up to the level of the state n,
which has the lowest quality of information
[
Iht
∣∣ S∗lnht < Sht] = (yl1ht +∑(n−1)k=1 ylkht(S∗l(k+1)ht − S∗lth )).
Knowing that on average any second period yields rents, long run rents in any state r relate to the
information asymmetries of all rural households in H = {h, h2, ...} on all layers l1, ..l2, .., n, yielding
limt∗→∞ ∑t
∗
t=0 Irt ∼ {Nl1h , Nl2h , .., Nnh , Nl1h2 , N
l2
h2
, .., Nnh2 , ...}. We can conclude that underestimation of
harvests limits the tax capacity of a state by reducing taxes that could be gained from the potential
output of household h in period t under perfect information YR by the rents I
[
Tht
∣∣ S∗lnht < Sht] =
T
(
AT ,YRt, st
)
− Iht.
Now turn to the case of an overestimation of soil quality, which at any point in time t can leave
any other element of the chain with agricultural output below subsistence after tax collection. In
the end, this was mostly true for the households. First, assume that households did not want
or could not leave the state—as we will focus on emigration later—so they decided to pay the
taxes. One option would have been working on the side to get the taxes from other sources. This
was dangerous, as it was highly illegal. Lords often sold households’ extra labor supply to urban
traders in form of monopsonies (Ogilvie, 2001). This included many forms of agricultural goods,
and also intermediaries, such as yarn. To uphold Lords’ income from these contracts with traders,
the informal labor market was illegal. The illegal labor market can be characterized as an exchange
of jobs undertaken by desperate households that often came with a health hazard plus a high risk
of capital punishment in case of being caught. Second, households could also resort to violence,
e.g. looting granaries. Third, households could starve. All three options had negative effects
on households’ ability to provide labor, which we will circumscribe with Q. Households could
try to move to a city, or another state. Given that cities also allow their citizens to subsist, due
to complete information on output, subjects living in a city cannot be overtaxed. If we imagine
our medieval households to be disutility minimizing, they would naturally prefer to live in the
town. However, as states use u as one of their decision variables to maximize taxes, they will only
allow this up to the point at which it reduces overall tax revenues. This can render within state
urbanization impossible.
27Arguing with Malthus, rents sought by households can lead to a higher population, until the returns to the factor
of labor diminish, and emphasize the effect of bad harvests (see also Mayshar et al., 2017, 2015; Voigtländer and Voth,
2013). In case gentry and nobility realize the rents, this can undermine the political stability of the state, and also lead to a
decrease in households’ fertility due to rising prices for staple food following Engel’s Law (Engel, 1857).
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Concerning migration to other states, we assume that all states are alike in their aim of extracting
all of their subjects’ taxable output, so that we can neglect tax competition between states. Consider
migration from any state i to the rural area of another state j, which households perceive to be the
most attractive due to its soil endowment and allows immigration due to its marginal product of
labor
∂Yj
∂Lj
. Migration of households to closer states is more probable than long-distance migration
for two reasons. First, households need to collect information about the state they contemplate
moving to (see Bursztyn and Cantoni, 2016). Second, their disappearance is less likely to be noted if
it only takes some hours to reach the border (Volckart, 1997, 2002; Blickle, 2006). Therefore, ﬂeeing
time d, the probability and severity of the punishment when caught, and the perceived information
asymmetries explain why migration from the household to the safe border of the destination
state is central28. The net migration X from any territorial state i to any other territorial state j
can be spelled out as XRijt = ∑h∈i →h2∈j
(
Nl1h ↑, Nl1h2 ,
(
∂Rj
∂Lj
− ∂Yi∂Li
)
↑, dhd ↓, Gi, Gj
)
with ∂X
R
rit
∂Gi
≶ 0 and
∂XRrjt
∂Gj
≶ 0. Destination states could ﬁnd it either beneﬁcial to stop peasants from immigrating,
depending on their marginal product of labor, by investing in G, but could also welcome the
arriving migrants by investing in G and allocating them to a ﬁeld to harvest for future seasons.29
In the absence of labor market regulations, this would only depend on immigrants’ marginal
product and their subsistence needs. The most recorded form of outmigration was ﬂeeing to
cities, especially Imperial cities. As cities produce use proto-industry technology AP and have
perfect information about their citizens, migration to any city j depends on technologies, marginal
product of labor in the city compared to rural areas30, and observability h ∈ i → h2 ∈ j : XPhjt =(
Nl1h ↑,
(
∂Pj
∂LPj
− ∂Pi
∂LPi
)
↑, Git, Gjt
)
while ∂X
P
rit
∂Git
≶ 0 and ∂X
P
rjt
∂Gjt
≶ 0.
3. Government Under Information Asymmetry
We established that states have room to reduce, or avoid, negative effects of asymmetric information
by spending on interior order G. This would deliver better information on tax cheaters, leading
28Carneiro (1970) and more recently Schönholzer (2017) go as far as viewing this mechanism as the nucleus of state
formation. They claim that the impossibility of ﬂeeing allowed coercive government.
29What we would today understand as poor relief was not established in German lands before the mid 17th century, nor
was the problem of migrant poverty seen as a ﬁeld of government action (Whaley, 2012, p. 261).
30Historic literature following Abel (1943, 1953) has focused on these factors, viewing the process of abandoning areas in
Central Germany solely as an outcome of wage differentials induced by the Black Death.
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to a reduction in households shirking, but it could also just lead to more innovation in tax
avoidance. States could also spy on subjects planning to ﬂee the country, or deport unwanted
immigrants. They could use police to suppress uprisings. It has also been recorded that agents
were sent to collect anyone without a master from neighbouring territories (Whaley, 2012, p.
252), which is essentially another form of investing in G. ‘Peuplierungspolitik’ (populationist
policies) (Whaley, 2012, p. 263), most prominently affecting religious minorities (see e.g., Hornung,
2014, for a later example), were an outcome of this problem. These costs G are the sum of
the costs for all households, Grt = ∑h∈H Grht. For any household h, these costs are given
by the characteristics of the household itself, but also all possible migration targets h2, ..., so
that Giht
(
AV , AR, AC, N
l1
h2
, ..., zhj, ..., Gj, ..., N
l1
h , N
l2
h , .., N
n
h , N
l1
h2
, Nl2h2 , .., N
n
h2
, ..., zhj2 , ...
)
. These costs
are aggregated on a state level. Similar to V, investment in one period creates maintenance
costs for future periods. Collecting information on emigration and tax avoidance builds on
established networks of trustworthy spies, so that aggregate G is given by Gt(∑h∈H Ght ↑, Gt−1)
while ∂Gt∂G(t−1) ≥ 0.
The overall effect of overestimating the soil quality for any household h in period t can be given
by the possible tax under perfect information from which is deducted the negative impacts on the
households that stay and the effects of emigration to all other countries J, so that
[
Tht
∣∣S∗lnht > Sht] =
T
(
ATt, Rt, st
)
− ∂Rt∂Q −∑j∈J XRjt . The two losses to tax revenue due to information asymmetries are
costly, and if these costs are ignored, they can undermine the state’s existence. The two types of
government spending we identiﬁed, V and G both have to be ﬁnanced by taxes. If they cannot be
ﬁnanced, states are bankrupt, iff Tt < V + G ⇒ ∑∞t∗=(t+1) T∗t = 0.
This yields that
Proposition 1. States with lower observability of agricultural output are left with a lower amount of taxes,
ceteris paribus.
and also due to the properties of the normally distributed signal that
Proposition 2. States with a lower observability of agricultural output face a higher risk of bankruptcy.
Now turn to the long run implications of this problem. Imagine the survival of a feudal state as a
continuous struggle of the ruling family to raise an heir to marriage age, and to ﬁnd an adequate
19
Origins of State Capacity
match (Stone, 1961). In the tradition of Gale and Shapley (1962), this matching process requires
a certain number of possible partners, and an ordered list of preferences for all partners. The
German high nobility was relatively closed, which allowed marriage market participants to be well
informed about what is on offer (Spieß (1993) and Hurwich (1998)). This gives us the proposition
that other participants on the marriage market would notice their problems with efﬁciently taxing
their subjects, moving them down their preference list on the marriage market, so that
Proposition 3. States with lower observability of agricultural output are inferior on the marriage market
4. War Over Territories With Information Costs
1 2 3 4
1
2
3
4
War
Time
Income/Budget Income i
Income j
Budget i
Budget j
Budget i - ﬁx costs
Budget j -ﬁx costs
0 8
0 6
0 1
⇒
0 8
0 6
0 1
Note: At equal soil quality, state i’s aggregated output from agriculture is perfectly observable, while state j’s signal is distorted.
Therefore i’s aggregated income varies signiﬁcantly between periods, which allows i to pay for the ﬁxed costs of war and overcome j’s
defense to conquer territory from j after harvest in period 3. State i would do so conditional on the observability of the conquerable plots,
and take over the best plots (indicated in dark red). After war, this would cause i to be larger compared to state i. Both states face a
decrease in their average observability. Also, i faces a trade-off between the potential income, and the added variation of income between
periods. If the conquest of one of the remaining plots would allow i to be attacked by another state (not in the picture), the visualized
’after war’-state is a new equilibrium.
Figure 3: Stylized example of two states competing for territory. The plot on the left shows the income/budget
of the states over time. The right visualization displays the observability of soil quality in two states, before
and after i’s attack on the southeastern plot.
What explains war? Consider state budget, and keep in mind that V comes with increasing returns
to scale. As outlined in ﬁg. 3, under certain conditions, state i will ﬁnd it proﬁtable to conquer
territory from i. He would invest in V above the budget the defendant would have to invest in
keeping the territory. If successful, the aggresor would increase its size a, which would also affect
its average Ricardian land rent r. The aggressor would choose exactly the territory that yields
the best combination of land rent, and observability, deduced by the one time costs of the attack
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and the recurring costs of defense. Depending on the magnitude of the increasing returns, a
geographically larger state might maximize its long-run tax revenue by taking over territory that
reduces its average land rent, and also its average observability. The higher the information costs
of i, the less funds can be raised for defense. If increasing returns to scale become very large
in magnitude, as implied by (Tilly, 1975; Gennaioli and Voth, 2015) for 16th century onwards,
this allows geographically larger and less observable states to overtake even more observable
territories. In the long run, this yields
Proposition 4. States with poor observability of agricultural output are geographically smaller, ceteris
paribus.
This shows that there are many channels via which information costs affect states, including the
risk of rent seeking intermediaries, mass starvation, outmigration, civil unrest, urbanization, and
war. We have linked this to geographical variables and the state of technology, which we assumed
to be common across states. The central outcome of this model is that it is costly to states to solve
problems caused by asymmetric information, and that in the long run this affects the survival of
the state.
Proposition 5. Any state with a higher observability of agricultural output than any other state also has a
higher probability of survival
Finally, it is well established that asymmetric technological and institutional changes in favor
of proto-industrial technology, accompanied by a period of wars, ﬂight to cities (Dincecco and
Gaetano Onorato, 2016), and also the ’military revolution’ lead to an unprecedented urbanization
after 1500 (Tilly, 1993; Voigtländer and Voth, 2013; Dittmar and Meisenzahl, 2017; Bosker et al.,
2013; Boix, 2015). This hints at a reduction in the diminishing returns to labor in cities, β ↓, and
also in the relative defense costs V for cities vs. territorial states. Territorial states would therefore
increase u (reducing the role of soil, and reducing the need for hierarchy as population decreases),
and city states would allow more immigration.
Proposition 6. The predictive power of agricultural observability diminishes over time, especially after the
structural changes around 1500.
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IV. Data
1. Dependent Variable: State Size
To calculate the size of a state, we digitized maps of the “reichsunmittelbare Territorien” (territories
directly subordinate to the Emperor) of the HRE (without its Italian parts) as provided in the school
atlas by Wolff (1877).31 These were the most detailed maps we could ﬁnd. Furthermore, Wolff
drew maps for the periods of decisive historical events of the HRE. These dates are 1250 (collapse
of the Staufer dynasty) 1378 (peak of political fragmentation), 1477 (Peace of Nancy), 1556 (Peace
of Augsburg), 1648 (Peace of Westphalia), and 1789 (outbreak of the French Revolution)32.
The maps contain the names of the territories, and their borders. It includes all types of states in the
Empire, i.e., city states (Imperial cities), large territorial states (kingdoms, duchies, principalities,
margraviates, counties etc.) and ecclesiastical states (bishoprics, archbishoprics and monastic
territories). However, each map contains white and unnamed territories (either because the
name of the territory was not certain or because the territory or territories were too small to be
included in the map). We tried to populate these white areas by comparing the different maps (as
sometimes a territory is included in one map but not in another one) and we also overlaid the
maps with Google maps. This enabled us to identify the territories based on the cities located
within them. We were also able to considerably reduce the white areas in the maps but still,
especially in 1477—when the map is less detailed than in the other years—some white areas
containing very small states or that were divided between several states in a complex manner,
remain. Nevertheless, as far as we are aware, ours are the most detailed and comprehensive
digitized maps of the states of the HRE currently available.
To validate and cross-check the maps and the included territories, we compared them to several
31To deﬁne only territories that were directly subordinate to the Emperor as states seems to be the consensus among
German historians the reason is that only those states had a degree of independence somehow similar to modern sovereign
state. States not directly subordinate to the Emperor were subordinate to a higher ranked ruler of another state (e.g. a
duchy), and the rulers of those state received them as a feudal estate (“feud”). However, their power over the territory
was limited. Another concern with the maps is whether the de jure situation was consistent with the de facto situation.
There could for example be territories that were not directly subordinate to the Emperor but nevertheless were de facto
independent. In Appendix A.1.4. we describe in detail who we decided when this was the case and also discuss some
examples of states where this was an issue.
32A detailed historical overview of these critical points of Central European history is given in section A.1.3. of the
Appendix.
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other maps of historical states in the HRE, including those of Darby and Fullard (1978); Stier et al.
(1956); Andree (1886), or Baldamus et al. (1914). Furthermore, we consulted the “Historisches
Lexikon der deutschen Länder” (Historical Encyclopedia of German States) (Köbler, 1988), a
comprehensive and reliable source that provides a historical overview of each German state from
the Middle Ages until the late 20th century, including their inception and downfall, the reasons
they disappeared, their legal status and name changes. We also consulted the ﬁrst volume of the
“Geschichte der deutschen Länder” Sante (1964), a monograph about the history of the German
states during the medieval and early modern period, that also names and gives detailed histories
of all territories that existed during that period. We used these publications to identify every state
on the map, verﬁy that they actually existed that they existed in this period and that their location
was correctly identiﬁed. We further checked that they were correctly classiﬁed by type, e.g. as a
duchy or county.33
Errors as to name, type of state or omission of an existing state occurred sometimes. Such problems
mostly arose in the case of small states on which information is limited even today (typically some
“Herrschaften”, states ruled by a baron or an imperial knight), when there were several territories
with the same name (e.g. “Limburg”) or for a few of Imperial cities in the Alsac-Lorrain region
which Wolff forgot.34 However, we were able to resolve almost all of these issues, sometimes by
consulting additional sources such as books by local historians.
Another difﬁculty was determining the start and end point of a states’ independence. The latte
was problematic, when, for example, a states was split up between the sons of a ruler and three
family lines ruled over three different parts of the former territory. Here, Wolff did not always
correctly recognize the division of the state, but we did so we found information about the shape
of the new territories or if the separated territories are included in later maps. Another issues
was that sometimes, after a ruling dynasty died out due to a lack of a male heir (or after a war
33To validate the city states drawn in the maps we also consulted Cantoni (2012) and the “Deutsche Städtebuch”
(Handbook of German cities) (Keyser and Stoob, 1939–1974) an encyclopaedia containing information on the history of
each German city from its foundation/ ﬁrst mentioning until the 20th century.
34Another case was that of the Imperial city of Friedberg and the burgraviate of Friedberg, located around a castle next
to the city. The latter was a very small county around the castle of Friedberg that was involved in various conﬂicts with
the nearby Imperial city. Wolff does not include both territories before the 1789 map, where he drew a territory called
Friedberg and marked it as an Imperial city. We split this territory between the Imperial city and the burgraviate from 1250
to 1378. In 1477 the Imperial city lost its independence (it was under the control of the burgraviate then for most of the
time) and thus, we assigned the whole territory to the burgraviate in the later maps—the burgraviate existed until 1806.
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about its heritage) a territory was partitioned between several other rulers. Here, we decided on a
case-by-case basis whether to assign the territory to the state that had the majority of rights or
whether it remained an independent state (when there was no clearly dominant party).3536
Overall, we identiﬁed 730 independent states, including 81 city states, 89 ecclesiastical territories
(bishoprics, archbishoprics and monastic states), and 560 secular territorial states. The latter group
consists of two kingdoms, Bohemia and Prussia, 48 duchies, 80 principalities 37, 16 republics
(all of them in today’s Switzerland), 217 counties38 and 180 “Herrschaften” (territories ruled by
“Freiherren” (barons)). Furthermore, there were seven Imperial territories (directly controlled
by the Emperor), among them were six “Landvogteien” (Grand Bailiffs) and one territory, the
Stauﬁan lands, controlled by the Stauﬁan Emperors during the 11th to 13th century. There are also
four territories that were occupied by the Swedes after the Thirty Years’ War. Finally, there are
nine electorates (among them three archbishoprics already counted above), which are considered
to be the most powerful states of the HRE and are hence considered an own category.39
Figure A.2 provides an overview of the HRE and its territorial and city states in each of the six
years for which we have a map from Wolff (1877).
35This was the case, for example, for the county of Sponheim which had a constantly changing political history. Details
on this case and how we solved it can be found in Appendix A.1.2.
36A lack of clarity about when a territory ceased to be an independent state typically arose also because Wolff
(and other historians) followed a tradition of drawing important states (like e.g., the duchy of Berg) as independent
(“reichsunmittelbare”) states even when they were de facto ruled by other nobles, as was the case for the united duchy of
Kleve-Jülich-Berg which was split up again after armed hostilities over the different parts, with one part (the duchy of
Kleve and the counties of Mark and Ravensberg) falling in the hands of the margrave of Brandenburg and another part
(the duchies of Berg and Jülich) coming under the control of the duchy of Pfalz-Neuburg. In these cases we diverge from
the map and make these territories part of Brandenburg or Pfalz-Neuburg, respectively.
37Apart from principalities, we also classify the following states into this category: Nine “Landgrafschaften” (landgravi-
ates), 17 “Markgrafschaften” (margraviates) and two Princely counties (the Princely county of Burgundy and the Princely
County of Tyrol). The reason for this is that the rulers of those states (the margrave, the landgrave etc.) were considered to
have the same rank as princes (although their names refer to their origins as counties).
38The 226 counties subsume the following territories with “county” in the name: Four “Pfalzgrafschaften” (county
palatinates). In general, the rulers of those territories (the palatinates) were considered to be of a higher rank than ordinary
counts (in the case of a “Pfalzgraf” (Palatinate)). One of these county palatinates, the “Pfalzgrafschaft bei Rhein” (County
Palatinate of the Rhine) had the status of an electorate from the middle of the 13th century (and was thereafter called
“Kurfürstentum Pfalz” (Electorate of the Palatinate)). Thus, it still was called a county palatinate but actually was one of the
most inﬂuential and powerful states within the Empire. Then, there are also six burgraviates and 207 ordinary “counties”.
It is important to note that counties were fairly heterogeneous regarding their size, and political importance. The county of
Württemberg, for example, for a long time the largest county of the Empire (before it became a duchy in 1495), was larger
than some of the principalities or duchies of the time and also had higher tax revenues than some of those higher-ranked
territories. Hence, one should not assume counties to be less important or smaller than duchies or principalities.
39The ofﬁcial title of those states differed. Some of them were called “Kurfürstentümer” (electoral principalities) some
are margraviates or county palatinates and the Habsburg monarchy called itself “Archduchy of Austria”.
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2. Main Explanatory Variable: Caloric Observability Index
To proxy observability, we propose an index that measures divergence from perfect observability
as proposed in the theoretical framework. This measure of observability of agricultural output is
based on the caloric suitability index developed in Galor and Özak (2014) and Galor and Özak
(2015).40 This index provides the average caloric yield per hectare per year for each grid cell
on a resolution of 300 arc seconds (0.083 degrees or around 85 km2 ).41 The average is derived
from the caloric suitability of all 49 crops for which the Global Agro-Ecological Zones (GAEZ)
project of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) provides global crop yield estimates and
that can be grown in the area of a state (caloric yields>0). Those estimated crop yields (given in
annual tons per hectare) are converted into calories using information on the caloric content of the
respective crops, available from the United States Department of Agriculture Nutrient Database
for Standard Reference. The commonly used agricultural suitability measures of Ramankutty et al.
(2002), or Zabel et al. (2014), report the fraction of each grid cell that is suitable for agriculture in
terms of probability. Compared to those standard indexes, the caloric suitability index has several
advantages. First, equally suitable land can have very different caloric yields, as land that is
suitable for agriculture will not necessarily be suitable for the crops with the highest caloric yields.
In a Malthusian subsistence society, the main purpose of agriculture is to feed the population, so
the caloric yield is central. Second, the caloric suitability index accounts for the fact that prior to
the Columbian Exchange not all of the 49 crops incorporated in the GAEZ database were actually
available (e.g. potatoes were not available in Europe). Finally, the index is not endogenous to
human activities, since Galor and Özak (2014) calculate the potential caloric yields assuming low
level of inputs and rain-fed agriculture (it abstracts from irrigation methods) and agro-climatic
constraints exogenous to human activities.
Our proxy for information cost, CNoise, is based upon the ruggedness index by Riley et al.
(1999) that is applied to data on the caloric suitability index CSI42 (not elevation). It is therefore
40The caloric suitability index can be downloaded here:  	
 
,
accessed on April, 24th 2016.
41We use the version of the index that does not include crops with zero productivity in the respective grid cell for the
calculation of the average caloric yields.
42This allows the usage of tools already implemented in QGIS or other GIS software and makes our results easy to
reproduce.
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deﬁned for raster data, holding data for row-column-coordinates (r, c). CNoise of any state s is
the average of all CNoise raster values in the state.43 We construct Caloric Observability Index by
linear transformation using the maximum over all states. This transformation has two semantic
advantages. First, it is a positive index that translates to lower information costs, the higher the
index. Second, it captures the idea that observability is a relative measure of comparable states that
compete with each other; the state with the weakest observability serves as a benchmark.
(r-1,c-1) (r-1,c) (r-1,c+1)
(r,c-1) (r,c) (r,c+1)
(r+1,c-1) (r+1,c) (r+1,c+1)
CNoise(r, c) =
√√√√ (r+1)∑
i=(r−1)
(c+1)
∑
j=(c−1)
[
CSI(i,j) − CSI(r,c)
]2
CNoises =
1
|(r, c) ∈ s| ∑
(r,c)∈s
CNoise(r,c))
Caloric Observability Indexs = −1( max
t∈States
(CNoiset)− CNoises)
For each column c and each row r, we derive the variance between the caloric suitability CSI
and that of its neighboring ﬁelds. If this variance is zero, measuring caloric suitability of one
ﬁeld would perfectly predict the suitability of neighboring ﬁelds, and caloric observability is
zero. With an increase in between-neighbor differences, the relationship between factor input
and output becomes less observable, and the households’ effort harder to observe. Hence, high
values of the COI correspond to low observability and vice versa. To ease the interpretation of
the COI, we transform it for the empirical analysis to ensure higher values correspond to higher
observability.
Figure 4 provides an overview of the average observability of the caloric yiles of each state of the
HRE in each of our six sampling years.
3. Other Explanatory Variables & Controls
To limit concerns about omitted variables bias, we include a number of variables to our data set
that should capture potentially relevant confounders of state capacity and size. Those are:
Agricultural conditions. A vast body of literature has pointed at soil quality as an indicator for
43This can be retrieved using the summary statistics tool in QGIS and ArcGIS, given the raster data and polygons on the
states
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(a) HRE 1250 (b) HRE 1378
(c) HRE 1477 (d) HRE 1556
(e) HRE 1648 (f) HRE 1789
Note: These ﬁgures shows the average Caloric Observability Index in each of the territories of the HRE at the different sampling years.
After 1500 New World crops become available due to the Columbian exchange and are included in the calculation of the COI. Increasing
caloric observability corresponds to increasingly darker shades of green; increasing shades of red denote decreasing caloric suitability.
Figure 4: Observability of Agricultural Output in the States of the HRE
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development (e.g., Diamond, 1999; Olsson and Hibbs, 2005). For example, von Thünen (1826) and
more recently Lindert (1999) and Kopsidis and Wolf (2012) have pointed at the link between urban
development and soil quality. Furthermore, the vast majority of the population was employed in
agriculture and had to feed the growing urban population which produced all the innovations
and proto-industrial activity. Thus, to account for the effect of the level of soil quality on state
development, we use the caloric suitability index by Galor and Özak (2014, 2015) that we already
have used to construct the observability index. A necessary prerequisite for crop farming was
deforestation, which was mostly ﬁnished by the 12th century (Wilson, 2016). We digitized data on
areas still forested (or otherwse non-arable, for example, marsh land) during the Middle Ages,
which is available for modern Germany from Schlüter (1952). With this variable we control for the
share of a territory’s area that was not deforested by the early Middle Ages. Finally, a growing
body of literature is concerned with the effects of speciﬁc crops, such as the potato, on various
economic outcomes (Nunn and Qian, 2011) and more recently Berger (2017). We therefore employ
both the pre-1500 and post-1500 speciﬁcation of the caloric suitability index. The fact that cereals,
which can be stored and transported, are easier for rulers to appropriate could also be a factor
(Mayshar et al., 2015). We control for this aspect with a variable measuring how the productivity
advantage of cereals over roots and tubers in a respective state. Finally, we include the average
temperature to account for climatic variations over time that could affect the agricultural output in
each state.
Border States. Recently, economic research has found evidence that state capacity within historical
and contemporary developing countries varies depending on the remoteness of a region (Olsson
and Hansson, 2011; Michalopoulos and Papaioannou, 2014). Thus, in peripheral areas state
capacity might be weaker. Looking at the HRE, it is evident that many of the border states were
politically unstable and conﬂict-prone, and eventually gained independence from the Emperor
(e.g. the Dutch Republic, Switzerland, the northern Italian cities etc.). Thus, we created a variable
to identify countries that are located on the outer border of the HRE in each of our sampling years,
to account for this. This also takes into account spatial effects of outward threats, especially the
expansion of France and the Ottoman Empire (see (Iyigun, 2008)).
Disease environment. Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) and Acemoglu and Johnson (2007) pro-
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posed that diseases affect outcomes via political institutions. This makes diseases potentially
relevant for our study. We collected data on the location of medieval swamp areas as well as prox-
imity to rivers, trade routes, and Imperial cities, which could have spread germs in the Middle Ages
as outlined in Börner and Severgnini (2014) and Voigtländer and Voth (2013). (Diamond, 1999) has
argued that everyday contact between humans and livestock creates resistance against diseases. This
was predominant in all regions of Central Europe (Mitterauer, 2004), but shows some variation
depending on the ruggedness of the terrain. We also include a variable measuring the average
temperature of each state, as it is well known that germs favor higher temperatures.
Heavy Plough. Alesina et al. (2013) and Anderson et al. (2016) document a profound impact
of the introduction of the heavy plough on gender inequality and city development. Thus, it is
very likely that it could also have affected state capacity, e.g. due to signiﬁcantly increasing the
productivity of agriculture within a state that adopted the plough (or adopted it earlier). Higher
productivity of agriculture increased agricultural output and therefore the absolute tax basis of
a state. We account for the effect of the heavy plough by a variable measuring the fraction of
a states’ area that was endowed with luvisol soils, a type of soil that particularly beneﬁted from
ploughing.
Natural Resources. It is well established that the availability of natural resources such as gold,
silver, salt and copper was a decisive factor determining a country’s state capacity and tax revenues.
Where minerals could have been exploited, mining was an alternative to agriculture, and rulers
could generate high revenues from mining activities (historically particularly true for the Harz
area and Saxony). To account for differences in natural resource endowments, we digitized maps
of the geographic location of copper, gold, lead, salt (rock salt and potassium salt) and silver. Based on
these maps we calculated a variable giving the average distance from 1,000 randomly generated
points within a state to the next deposit of those resources. Additionally, we have data on areas
within contemporary Germany that were still forested in the Middle Ages and hence provided a
supply of wood—one of the most important raw materials in the pre-modern economy.
Outmigration. As discussed above, outmigration to Imperial cities posed a vital threat to the
ﬁnancial base of medieval and early-modern states. Thus, we compute a variable that proxies the
outmigration opportunities by the average distance from 1000 randomly generated points within
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a state to the next Imperial city.
Pre-Existing Cultural and Historical Differences. We can account for the effect of a priori cultural
differences in the HRE by assigning each of its later states to one of the states existing in 1150 using,
again, a map of European states in 1150 AD by Wolff (1877). The states in 1150 largely reﬂected
old, traditional borders of the territories of Germanic tribes (like the stem duchies, which reﬂected
the territories of the Germanic tribes of the Bavarians, Franks, Swabians and Saxons).44 To address
the possibility of pre-existing, deeply rooted factors inﬂuencing state capacity in medieval Europe,
we include a variable for the area of each state that was already settled in pre-historic times.
These areas might have a longer history of statehood or other positive characteristics making them
attractive for settlement.45
Terrain Characteristics. We also control for the maximum elevation above sea level and average
ruggedness of a states’ territory, using the digital elevation model provided by thee U.S. Geological
Survey’s Center for Earth Resources Observation and Science (EROS). Both factors could affect
state capacity because they have an inﬂuence on the defensibility of the area of a state.
Trade and Tariff Income. Trade affects our analysis in many different ways. First, trade was
a source of revenue, as trading cities were usually wealthy and generated large tax revenues.
Furthermore, trade took place along trade routes, rivers and Roman roads therefore rulers could
impose tolls on trade routes and navigable rivers within their territories (Heckscher, 1994).46 Tariff
income from such road tolls could be signiﬁcant and made some territories e.g., those straddling
both sides of the Rhine, very wealthy.47 Finally, if a lot of rivers or trade routes were located
within a state, it was easier for its citizens (and the ruler) to access commercial centers. Therefore,
these states proﬁted from better market access and lower transaction costs. We proxy for these
44After the Migration Period more than four centuries before, the areas in which different Germanic tribes settled have
been relatively stable.
45We can also rule out nationalism as a unifying element within the HRE and a dividing element between different sub
areas that would not be captured by tribal areas in 1150. There is wide consensus that nationalism cannot be attributed to
Central Europe before the 18th century, if not the French Revolution (Weber, 1976; Anderson, 1983). We conclude from this
that the sizes of states were too small for heterogeneous preferences in the spirit of Alesina and Spolaore (1997) or Bolton
and Roland (1997) to limit the growth of states.
46There is a growing literature documenting the importance of the Roman road network for the long-run development
of Europe (e.g.Wahl (2017)). This makes it even more important to account for the Roman road network and its possible
effects.
47The small sizes of states introduce competition between them over trade routes, so that any single state can only raise
its overall revenues from tariffs to the level that drives traders to change their routes (Huning and Wolf, 2016).
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advantages with variables measuring the average distance from 1000 randomly generated points
within a state to the next Roman road, trade route or major navigable river. We also control for
trade fairs, which were identiﬁed by Milgrom et al. (1990), and more recently Edwards and Ogilvie
(2012) as classic example of medieval trade institutions. With respect to access to ﬁnancial markets,
the results of Volckart and Wolf (2006) suggest that there is a strong correlation between the spatial
pattern of the integration of commodity markets on the one side, and ﬁnancial markets on the
other. We therefore assume to have controlled for spatial variation of ﬁnancial integration with the
above.
War and Conﬂicts. Several authors have argued that war and conﬂicts were a driver for state
capacity in Europe, e.g. because of competition between states fostering technological and
organizational innovations (e.g. in taxation technologies) (Hoffman, 2011; Karaman and Pamuk,
2013; Tilly, 1975). We construct a variable measuring the number of battles that had taken place
within a state between 800 and 1378 AD, normalized by a state’s area. Romer (2009) and Acemoglu
et al. (2011) have pointed to the beneﬁts of importing efﬁcient political institutions, which in
our historical setting is captured either via trade as a market for ideas, or conﬂicts. Radical
modernization occurs well after the period in our study (also see Mokyr (2011)).
A descriptive overview of the variables in the data set can be found in Table A.1. Deﬁnitions and
the sources of all the variables can be found in the Online Data Appendix (Appendix A.2). The
maps on which we base our geographic variables are in section A.4 of the Appendix.
V. Empirical Analysis and Results
1. Caloric Observability and the Financial Capacity of States
We expect a signiﬁcant and positive statistical relationship between caloric observability and the
ﬁnancial capacity of a state (proposition 1) and test this empirically. Following Cantoni (2012) we
proxy the ﬁnancial capacity and economic and military power of a state by its contribution (in
guilder) to the Imperial war tax (“Reichsmatrikel”) in 1521.48 The Reichsmatrikel contributions
48There are three types of contributions: states had to contribute mounted and foot soldiers as well as a certain
contribution in guilders. To monetize the whole contribution we follow Cantoni (2012) and assume—in line with the
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are taken from Zeumer (1913). We have matched the territories mentioned in the Reichsmatrikel
with the states in our data set.49 If a state existed in 1521 and 1556, we assigned its Reichsmatrikel
contribution to the year 1556 in our data set. If a state existed in 1521 but not in 1556, we assigned
its contribution to the year 1477 in our data set. Overall, we could match 236 states.50
We then run a cross-sectional regression where each state’s Reichsmatrikel contribution is explained
by its caloric observability and different sets of control variables. Thus, we estimate the following
equation using OLS:
ln(IMPERIAL_TAX)ic = α+ βln(COIi) + γ′Xi + λc + 	i (1)
Where ln(IMPERIAL_TAX)ic is the natural logarithm Reichsmatrikel contribution of state i of
type c in the Reichsmatrikel of 1521. ln(COIi) is the natural logarithm of caloric observability of a
states’ agricultural output. Xic is a vector of different set of controls comprising of the variables
introduced above. The set of basic geographic controls is made up of: of the following variables:
average distance to a major river, maximum elevation, average terrain ruggedness and a dummy
for states located on the outer border of the HRE in that year. Variables controlling for soils and
climate are caloric suitability, average temperature, share of luvisol soils, and the productivity
advantage of growing cereals instead of roots and tubers. The set of “Economic Factors and
Resources” variables includes the average distance to the closest trade route, trade fair, Roman
road, Imperial city, copper, gold, iron, lead, potassium salt, rock salt or silver deposit. λc are
state type dummies (for kingdoms, electoral states, ecclesiastical territories, duchies, princedoms,
margraviates, counties, republics and “Herrschaften”), capturing unobserved shocks that might
have affected different types of states in a different way and also unobserved historical factors
making a certain state a kingdom and another one only a county.51 	ic is the error term.
historical literature—that the pay of a mounted soldier was 12 guilders and that for foot soldiers was 4 guilders and
multiply for the number of each type of soldier.
49It is known that the Reichsmatrikel list has errors, i.e. it contains states that were not or no longer independent
(“reichsunmittelbar”) or for which this status is doubtful. Furthermore, our maps give us information about the states in
1477 and 1556 but not for 1521. Thus, we have to rely on information from Köbler (1988) and other sources to match the
states in our maps to those of the Reichsmatrikel.
50The average Reichsmatrikel contribution was 629.4 guilders with the minimum being zero and the largest contribution
being 11,940 guilders (from the states controlled by the Habsburgs).
51The base category remaining are states occupied by the Swedish after the Thirty Year’s War and Imperial territories
directly controlled by the Emperor (i.e., bailiffs and Stauﬁan territories). The electoral states are not double counted as they
are not coded as e.g., duchy, margraviate, kingdom or county palatinate.
32
Origins of State Capacity
Results are shown in Table 1.52 They show that, reassuringly, there is statistically and economically
signiﬁcant positive relationship between the Reichsmatrikel contributions and caloric observability.
This relationship—while being marginally statistically signiﬁcant— is almost unaffected by the
inclusion of different sets of control variables and implies that, on average, a one percent increase
in observability increases the Reichsmatrikel contribution by about 0.17 percent. This positive
relationship is presented in Figure 5, showing a partial regression plot of ln(Caloric Observability)
for the regression in Table 1, column (4).
Table 1: Caloric Observability and Financial Capacity of States
Dependent Variable ln(Reichsmatrikel Contribution)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Caloric Observability) 0.173* 0.168* 0.187* 0.185*
(0.0949) (0.0971) (0.0999) (0.100)
State Type Dummies    
Caloric Suitability    
Basic Geographic Variables    
Caloric Suitability    
Soils and Climate –   
Economic Factors and Resources – –  
Battles per Area – – – 
Observations 235 235 235 235
R2 0.518 0.526 0.560 0.563
Notes. Heteroskedasdicity robust standard errors are reported in parentheses. Coefﬁcient is statisti-
cally different from zero at the *10 % level. The unit of observation is a state. All regressions include
a constant not reported. State Dummies are dummy variables indicating electoral states (“Kur-
fürstentümer”), kingdoms, margraviates, duchy, princedoms, counties, republics, “Herrschaften”
and ecclesiastical states. The set of basic geographic controls comprises a variable measuring the
average distance of 1,000 randomly distributed points within a state to the closest major river, its
maximum elevation above sea-level, its average ruggedness and a dummy for states adjacent to the
boundary of the HRE. Soil and climate controls include the natural logarithm of a state’s average
caloric suitability index, the average caloric suitability for growing cereals relative to grow roots
and tubers, the fraction of a state’s area with luvisol soil that beneﬁts most from plowing and a
measure for the average temperature in a state. The control variables in “Economic Factors and
Resources” include variables measuring the average distance of 1,000 randomly distributed points
within a state to the closest Roman road, major medieval trade route, trade fair, gold, copper, silver,
iron, lead, potassium salt or rock salt deposit.
52By taking the natural logarithm we lose one observation (Gr. Saarwerden) which has a recorded contribution of zero.
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Note: This ﬁgure shows a partial regression plot of ln(Caloric Observability) for the regression in Table1, column (4)
Figure 5: The Relationship between Caloric Observability and Financial Capacity of States
2. Caloric Observability and the Failure and Survival of States
To investigate our theoretical propositions 2, 3, and 5, regarding the relationship of observability
and the fate of states, i.e. whether and how a state disappeared, we were able to collect data
on 367 events leading to the failure (dissolution/ disappearance) of states, mostly from Köbler
(1988) and other sources on regional history.53 To provide descriptive statistics of the link between
observability and state failure, we provide box plots separated box plots of the COI for different
categories of reasons for failure. They are shown in Figure 6.
In general, the most frequent—and probably most unsystematic—reason for state failure was the
death of a ruler without a male heir. This is not surprising, given that fertility of the nobility
was generally low.54 The probability of anybody dying of an accident or a common infection
was high.55 Adam Smith was right that the geography of Switzerland set it on a different path.
Consider Figure 6a on the period before 1500 (reasons of state failure in 1250, 1378 and 1477). Most
prominently, bankruptcy is the leading reason for failure of states with bad observability, which
53The territories that are lost in each of the maps as well as the reason for their disappearance are shown in Appendix
Figure A.3.
54See e.g., Schröter (2007) for an overview.
55Cummins (2017) shows that during the Middle Ages, nobles regularly died on the battle ﬁeld and their life expectancy
was about 50 years.
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is in line with proposition 2 from the model. When the ruling family of a state ended without a
single male heir, partition or inheritance by other states/noble families could be the consequence,
which also includes inheritance by the ﬁrst daughter’s husband (in the plot: in family). States that
were sold or given away, leading to the departure of the ruling dynasty (plot: ex family), were
associated with about the same observability, with a few outliers displaying low observability.
States that were conquered in wars were on average endowed with lower observability, which
points towards the role of the decreasing marginal cost of protection on the victorious side.
Federal rule leading to the end of a state was rare, and so was secularization before the Reformation.
After 1500 (Figure 6b), sorting by observability becomes more prominent, distinguishing within and
out-of-the-family inheritance. Furthermore, bankruptcy is even more prominently associated with
bad observability. However, those states that were conquered show a high observability pointing
towards the direction of a regime change, which is a puzzle we will investigate further.
(a) Before 1500 (N=257) (b) After 1500 (N=110)
Note: This ﬁgure distinguishes different reasons for failure of a medieval state. From left to right these are that a single heir was not
present, and another branch of the family took over via marriage, partition, or inheritance rules (in family). If this was not the case, the
territory was sold, given away, or left the dynasty (ex family). Bankruptcy was a reason for a living dynasty to loose their territory, war
was another. Federal ruling leading to the loss of a territory was rare. The states to form the Swiss Confederation left the Empire. Some
territories were secularized, mostly after 1556.
Figure 6: Descriptive statistics of observability by different reasons states failed
Is observability of agricultural output signiﬁcantly positively associated with the survival of states
during the Middle Ages? States with a high observability of agricultural output should be capable
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of remaining independent for a longer time due to better defensive capacities, more effective
abilities to restrict outmigration, etc. To test this empirically, we run Cox proportional hazard
models including all the baseline control variables (but, of course, no year dummies).56 The results
are in Table 2 and suggest that, indeed, caloric observability was signiﬁcantly positively related
to state survival during the Middle Ages, but in the 17th and 18th century. To be precise, during
the medieval period a ten percent increase in caloric observability raised the probability of a state
surviving by around 0.6 percent.
Table 2: Observability and the Survival of States
Dependent Variable Periods a State Exist
(1) (2) (3)
All Periods Until 1477 After 1477
ln(Caloric Observability) 1.424*** 0.94** 1.026
(0.0563) (0.0237) (0.0371)
Baseline Controls   
Observations 1,925 1,083 842
Wald Chi2 961.82 1183.61 2523.85
Notes. Standard errors clustered on state-level are reported in parentheses. The tables
reports hazard ratios obtained from running a Cox proportional hazard model using
Breslow method for ties. Hazard ratio is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5
% and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a state.
3. Caloric Observability, the Size of a States and the Dynamics of Statehood
We now test our theoretical proposition about the relationship between state size (proposition 4)
and observability and the temporal evolution of this relationship (proposition 6). We run pooled
OLS regressions using the unbalanced panel data set of states in the HRE as explained above.
Our data set includes information on 730 states and for six points in time amounting to 1,925
state-year pairs being our observations. As observability of agricultural output is orthogonal
to economic activities, political institutions and human activity—at least in the period studied—
56We estimate the Cox proportional hazard model using the Breslow method for ties. Other methods to handle tied
failures like those proposed by Efron would yield very similar results. Those estimations are not reported but available
uponn request. The results would also hold if we exclude the states who exit the data set because they left the Empire and
became part of another state entity (like Switzerland) and because their ruling family extinguished (what arguably should
be a random event in most cases). Results are available upon request.
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reverse causality should not be a very critical issue. Nonetheless, there still could be a third (and
unobserved) factor positively correlated with both caloric observability and political fragmentation.
We address this potential bias by including several control variables, which were introduced
in the previous section, in the regression speciﬁcation. In addition to the control variables, we
include year ﬁxed effects to account for temporal shocks that affect all of the HRE equally, and
we also include eight state type dummies. Thus, to identify our effect we only exploit variation
in observability and state size within the same year and within the same types of states. To be
precise, we estimate variants of the following regression equation:
ln(STATEAREA)ic,t = α+ βln(COIi,t) + γ′Xi,t + δt + λc + 	i,t (2)
Where ln(STATEAREA)ic,t is the natural logarithm of the area in km2 of state i of type c in year t.
δt are year dummies. The rest of the equation is deﬁned as in equation 1 In robustness checks, we
include dummy variables for the states to which a certain territory belonged in 1150 AD, dummy
variables assigning each historical state to its modern-day equivalent, and variables reporting
certain characteristics (e.g., area, soil quality or observability of agricultural output) of neighboring
states.57
Later in the empirical analysis, we want to identify the temporal evolution of the effect of
observability of agricultural output on state size. We estimate equation 2 as cross-sectional
equation, separately for each year. Furthermore, we interact the caloric observability with the year
dummies and estimate equation 3:
ln(STATEAREA)ic,t = α+∑
t∈Γ
β′tln(COIi,t) · δt + γ′Xi,t + δt + λc + 	i,t (3)
Where ln(COIi,t) · δt is the interaction of the COI with year dummies, and all other variables
match those in equation 2.
First, we estimate equation 2 to statistically test the relationship between observability of agri-
cultural output and state size. Results of the estimations are reported in Table 3. We start with
a simple baseline speciﬁcation only including year ﬁxed effects and basic geographic control
variables.
57We assigned a state to those state in 1150 or contemporary country in which the majority of its area is located.
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Caloric observability is highly statistically and economically signiﬁcant with a one percent increase
in observability increasing state size by around 0.5 percent. From columns (2) to (6) we add
progressively more sets of control variables, to look how the coefﬁcient reacts to the inclusion
of covariates. In column (2) we add soil and climate controls, and the coefﬁcient only decreases
slightly. In column (3) we add variables proxying economic factors and resources. These variables
decrease the coefﬁcient of observability, but it remains economically and statistically signiﬁcant.
The inclusion of battles per state area in column (4) has virtually no effect on the results and the
battles themselves are not signiﬁcant. In column (5), nine state type dummies are added to further
reduce unobserved heterogeneity.
Table 3: Observability of Agricultural Output and State Size
Dependent Variable ln(Area)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
ln(Caloric Observability) 0.529*** 0.500*** 0.286*** 0.287*** 0.259*** 0.141** 0.27***
(0.0740) (0.0727) (0.0665) (0.0665) (0.0532) (0.0527) (0.068)
Year Dummies       
State Type Dummies – – – –   
1150 State Dummy – – – – –  –
Basic Geographic Variables       
Soils and Climate –      
Economic Factors and Resources – –     
Battles per Area – – –    
Early Settled, Forest & Swamp Area – – – – – – 
Observations 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,925 1,866 990
R2 0.329 0.386 0.522 0.522 0.682 0.709 0.67
Notes. Standard errors clustered on state-level are reported in parentheses. Coefﬁcient is statistically different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and
*10 % level. The unit of observation is a state. All regressions include a constant not reported. State Dummies are dummy variable indicating
electoral states (“Kurfürstentümer”), kingdoms, margraviates, duchy, princedoms, counties, republics, “Herrschaften” and ecclesiastical states.
The set of basic geographic controls comprises of a variable measuring the average distance of 1,000 randomly distributed points within a state
to the closest major river and city state, its maximum elevation above sea-level, its average ruggedness and a dummy for states adjacent to the
boundary of the HRE. Soil and Climate controls include the natural logarithm of a state’s average caloric suitability index, the average caloric
suitability to grow cereals relative to grow roots and tubers, the fraction of a states area with luvisol soil that beneﬁts most from plowing and
a measure for the average temperature in a state.The control variables in “Economic Factors and Resources” include variables measuring the
average distance of 1,000 randomly distributed points within a state to the closest Roman road, major medieval trade route, trade fair, gold,
copper, silver, iron, lead, potassium salt or rock salt deposit.
However, this again leaves the coefﬁcient of caloric observability almost unchanged.58 In columns
58With regard to the control variables, several interesting results emerge from this speciﬁcation. For example, distance to
the closest Imperial city is signiﬁcantly positively associated with state size, pointing to the fact that outmigration may
indeed have played an important role for the tax capacity of feudal states. Another interesting result is the signiﬁcant
positive effect of battles per state area and the negative and signiﬁcant coefﬁcient of distance to copper, iron, lead and
potassium salt deposits. These indicate the importance of natural resources and war for the capacity of states. The
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(7) and (8), we lose some observations, as we restrict the sampling area to the extent of the HRE in
1150. We do this, by including dummy variables that assign the territories of the HRE to the state
to which they belonged in 1150 AD. As explained in the previous section, this is to account for
pre-existing cultural differences, as the states in 1150 largely reﬂected the traditional territories
of Germanic tribes. The coefﬁcient of caloric suitability further decreases but remains signiﬁcant
suggesting that a one percent increase in observability raises state size by around 0.13 percent.
Finally, in column (7), the sample is restricted further to historical states within the borders of
contemporary Germany, as we control for the area (in m2) within a state that was already settled
in pre-historic times (and hence, might have a longer history of statehood) that was still forested
or consisted of swamps and ﬂood plains in the Middle Ages. None of these variables stop caloric
observability from being signiﬁcant, although both forest areas and early settled areas show a
signiﬁcant positive effect. The coefﬁcient remains about 0.25, and hence, increases again, when
compared to column (6).
We then conduct checks to ensure that our baseline results are sufﬁciently robust. The results are
in Table 4. First, we investigate the effect of modern country dummies on the preferred baseline
speciﬁcation (Table 3, column (5)).59 The estimated coefﬁcient, including those contemporary
countries is reported in Table 4, column (1) and shows that the coefﬁcient of observability only
decreases slightly when these dummies are included. This suggests that unobserved heterogeneity
connected to larger political entities (some of which were created during the existence of HRE e.g.,
Switzerland) does not decisively inﬂuence the effect of caloric observability.
Second, in column (2), we account for the fact that not all land in a state was either settled or
suitable for agriculture, so considering the whole area of a state might introduce bias. Thus,
we subtract from the overall area of each state those areas with forests, swamps, ﬂood plains,
lakes, estuaries and coastal marsh, to use this variable "Settled area" as dependent variable. As
information on these areas is only available for contemporary Germany, the sample is again
signiﬁcantly positive effect of maximum elevation also points towards defensibility of the area as an important factor.
Finally, caloric suitability itself is positively related to state size, although the estimated coefﬁcient (0.091) is much smaller
than that of observability. Thus, it is not only the observability of agricultural output, but also the productivity of
agriculture that matters, but observability seems to be much more important.
59The HRE spanned 13 contemporary countries. These are Austria, Belgium, Switzerland, Czech Republic, Germany,
France, Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Lichtenstein, the Netherlands, Poland and Slovenia. In the regression we include 12
modern country dummies, with Austria being the omitted country.
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reduced to historical states within modern Germany. Again, the coefﬁcient becomes smaller in
magnitude but remains signiﬁcant.
Third, in column (3) we show what happens if we take into account that, due to the different size
of the states, some variables, like ruggedness, or caloric observability, that are calculated based on
differences between the data points of the underlying raster data, could be mechanically higher in
larger states.
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Thus, we inversely weight each observation by the number of ruggedness data points that are
located within the state. Results are virtually identical.
Fourth, in column (4) we include a variable measuring the number of separated territories that
make up a state. The medieval HRE was made up of non-contiguous areas. States with highly
fragmented territory will have higher tax collection costs, information and defense costs might be
larger, and it could be less susceptible to take over. However, this does not change the resulting
coefﬁcient estimate a lot. The next three columns (5-7) show what happens if one estimates the
preferred baseline speciﬁcation using different variants of the caloric observability and state size
measure. In column (5), we employ caloric observability and state area in levels instead of natural
logarithms. The resulting coefﬁcient is statistically and economically signiﬁcant. Therefore, the
results are not driven by taking the natural logarithms of both variables.
In column (6) we estimate the baseline regression using a caloric observability index also taking
into account plants that become available only after the Columbian Exchange. In column (7) we
use a version of the caloric observability index computed under the assumption that only the crop
giving the highest caloric yield is actually planted. This is winter barley in all states. Both times,
the estimated coefﬁcient is similar to that obtained in Table 3, column (5).
Finally, in column (8) we conduct a placebo-test. We only consider the years prior to 1556 (that
is 1250, 1378 and 1477) and test if the difference in caloric observability before and after the
Columbian exchange has explanatory power—which should not be the case. Reassuringly, these
differences do not explain state size prior to 1500, making it unlikely that our results emerged by
chance.
Another concern with the baseline estimates could be that not only characteristics of a certain
state itself matter for its capacity. As states compete for labor and territory, characteristics of
surrounding states are relevant. Thus, we take the baseline regression speciﬁcation and add
variables capturing relevant characteristics of a state’s neighbors. Results are reported in Table 5,
where we add an additional set of neighbor characteristics to the baseline speciﬁcation in each
column. All in all, while neighbor characteristics somehow reduce the size of the coefﬁcient of
caloric observability to about 0.16, this is still a large and economically and statistically signiﬁcant
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effect. Interestingly, the results imply that neither the caloric suitability nor the caloric observability
of the neighbor states has a signiﬁcant impact.
However, states surrounded by small states are signiﬁcantly larger than states surrounded by
large states (as shown by the negative and signiﬁcant estimate of the neighbor states area and
the positive coefﬁcient of the number of neighbor states). It also seems to be the case that states
were larger when their neighbors did not have access to nearby major rivers while the opposite
is true for access to resources. Thus, states have proﬁted from having resource-rich states as
neighbors, but were better off if their neighbors were further away from important transportation
networks.
One important implication of our theoretical argument is that caloric observability should only
matter for state size during the medieval period as later on, the scale effect becomes more and
more important. To see whether this is the case, we run two types of regressions. First, we interact
the caloric suitability index with year dummies and look at how the effect of caloric observability
develops over time (Table 6). We ﬁnd that, while the interaction terms are predominantly signiﬁcant
(apart from column (2) where the coefﬁcient loses signiﬁcance for 1648 and 1789), in line with our
expectations, the coefﬁcient notably declines after 1556.
Second, we run separate cross-section regressions for each of the six years in our data set (Table 7).
Here, the coefﬁcients of caloric observability are highly statistically signiﬁcant and vary between
0.2 and 0.33. Again conﬁrming our theoretical reasoning, in 1648 and 1789 the coefﬁcient of caloric
observability is not signiﬁcant and is notably smaller in size.
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Table 5: Observability of Agricultural Output and State Size—Controlling for Neighbor Characteristics
Dependent Variable ln(Area)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln(Caloric Observability) 0.238*** 0.204*** 0.194*** 0.171***
(0.0564) (0.0527) (0.0518) (0.0504)
ln(Neighbor Caloric Observability) -0.0561 0.0304 -0.0169 0.0722
(0.0758) (0.0684) (0.0708) (0.0791)
ln(Neighbor Caloric Suitability) 0.409*** 0.182 0.208 -0.357
(0.145) (0.135) (0.135) (0.251)
ln(Neighbor Area) -0.0592*** -0.0468** -0.00534
(0.0220) (0.0213) (0.0235)
Number of Neighbor States 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.110***
(0.0240) (0.0240) (0.0240)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Trade Routes -0.00377* -0.00242
(0.00201) (0.00231)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Roman Road -0.00294*** -0.00184
(0.00110) (0.00185)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Large River 0.00559* 0.00575*
(0.00291) (0.00293)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Gold 4.37e-06
(2.69e-06)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Silver -1.19e-06
(1.33e-06)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Copper -4.53e-06**
(2.28e-06)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Iron -2.96e-06
(2.02e-06)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Pottasium Salt -3.11e-06**
(1.27e-06)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Rock Salt -2.26e-06
(1.39e-06)
Neighbor Mean Distance to Lead Resev 7.48e-07
(2.16e-06)
Neighbor Mean Relative Cereals Suitability 9.97e-05***
(3.45e-05)
Neighbor Share of Luvisol Soils -0.110***
(0.0415)
Baseline Controls    
Observations 1,842 1,842 1,842 1,842
R2 0.679 0.735 0.738 0.746
Notes. Standard errors clustered on state-level are reported in parentheses. Coefﬁcient is statistically different from zero at
the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a state. All regressions include a constant not reported. Baseline
controls include year and state type dummies, the basic geography, soil and climate, economic factors and resources controls
as well as battles per area.
44
Origins of State Capacity
Table 6: Temporal Evolution of the Effect of Observability on State Size
Dependent Variable ln(Area)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
COI*1250 0.256*** 0.144** 0.179** 0.232***
(0.0598) (0.0598) (0.0824) (0.0593)
COI*1378 0.250*** 0.153** 0.317*** 0.226***
(0.0626) (0.0620) (0.0751) (0.0608)
COI*1477 0.319*** 0.192*** 0.327*** 0.297***
(0.0668) (0.0649) (0.0947) (0.0663)
COI*1556 0.293*** 0.149** 0.322*** 0.238***
(0.0639) (0.0668) (0.0921) (0.0634)
COI*1648 0.187** 0.0692 0.253** 0.176**
(0.0767) (0.0777) (0.104) (0.0768)
COI*1789 0.201** 0.0484 0.225** 0.166**
(0.0846) (0.0838) (0.100) (0.0832)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
1150 State Dummies No Yes No No
Share Early Settled & Forest Area No No Yes No
Modern Country Dummies No No No Yes
Observations 1,925 1,866 990 1,925
R2 0.683 0.709 0.671 0.693
Notes. Standard errors clustered on state-level are reported in parentheses. Coefﬁcient is statistically
different from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a state. All
regressions include a constant not reported. Baseline controls include year and state type dummies,
the basic geography, soil and climate, economic factors and resources controls as well as battles per
area.
Table 7: Observability of Agricultural Output and State Size—Cross Sections
Dependent Variable ln(Area)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Year 1250 1378 1477 1556 1648 1789
ln(Caloric Observability) 0.209*** 0.213*** 0.252** 0.358*** 0.120 0.104
(0.0763) (0.0737) (0.106) (0.0811) (0.118) (0.135)
Baseline Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
State Type Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 368 402 313 367 255 220
R2 0.665 0.688 0.704 0.698 0.736 0.751
Notes. Standard errors clustered on state-level are reported in parentheses. Coefﬁcient is statistically different
from zero at the ***1 %, **5 % and *10 % level. The unit of observation is a state. All regressions include a constant
not reported. Baseline controls include state type dummies, the basic geography, soil and climate, economic factors
and resources controls as well as battles per area.
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VI. Conclusion
This paper has studied the determinants of tax capacity in medieval Central Europe. Because
the HRE was a federation of states for hundreds of years, we have been able to connect the
location, history and geographic circumstances of hundreds of states via our model. We have
shown theoretically and empirically that the observability of agricultural output, via its impact on
taxation capacity and the political structure of states, was a primary determinant of state size and
survival in medieval Central Europe. We employed the theory of incomplete contracts to shed
light on the dynamics of state capacity, before revolutionary social and economic events, from
1496 onwards, changed the game.
Our results provide evidence for the interaction of agriculture, climate, and geography in ex-
plaining political outcomes such as state capacity or regime. This adds a new perspective to the
existing large and inﬂuential literature that links geography, climate and agriculture to long-run
differences in economic outcomes (Diamond, 1999; Olsson and Hibbs, 2005). We have proposed
a GIS measurement of observability of agricultural output that actually measures the degree of
information asymmetry in an early society. As this index is well grounded in theoretical economic
reasoning, it is potentially useful for other research endeavors in economic history, and long-run
development.
This paper is a starting point for important further analyses—for example, why agricultural
observability lost its explanatory power for state capacity during the early-modern period. This
step would improve our understanding of the dynamics of state capacity in Europe over the last
1000 years. Potential factors to examine are the increased impact of technological innovations
(e.g, de la Croix et al., 2017), or advances in education during the Reformation (Dittmar and
Meisenzahl, 2017), 2017), which lead to increased urbanization and reduced a state’s dependence
on agricultural output for revenue. There are also opportunities for further study of the role of
this observability mechanism in single states and other regions of the world.
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DATA APPENDIX
A.1. Dependent Variable
A.1.1. The Underlying Maps
The area of a state (“reichsunmittelbares Territorium”) is calculated based on shapeﬁles created
from maps of the non-Italian parts of the Holy Roman Empire printed in Wolff (1877). One of those
maps, “Deutschland beim Tode Karl des IV. im Jahre 1378” (“Germany at the death of Charles
IV. in the year 1378”) is shown below in Figure A.1. Note that this map incorrectly includes the
state of the Teutonic Order, so when digitizing the map we excluded this area. The maps are
available here:  	


	
  (accessed on January 22, 2016).
Note: This ﬁgure shows the original map of the HRE as printed in Wolff (1877). For our empirical analysis we digitized this map using
GIS software.
Figure A.1: Germany at the Death of Charles IV. in the Year 1378 (Wolff, 1877)
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A.1.2. States in the Holy Roman Empire 1250–1789
(a) HRE 1250 (b) HRE 1378
(c) HRE 1477 (d) HRE 1556
(e) HRE 1648 (f) HRE 1789
Figure A.2: The Holy Roman Empire and its territorial states (gray) and city states (red) at our sampling
years
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A.1.3. Historical Background of the Sampling Years
(i) 1250 was the year of the death of Frederick II., the last Emperor of the Staufer dynasty. The
Staufer dynasty had ruled the Empire as kings and emperors for more than 110 years. The
whole dynasty (and with them central power) collapsed soon after, in 1254, when his only
son Konrad IV., who was King of Germany but never Emperor, died. Following the collapse
of the Staufer dynasty, a 20 year period called the “Great Interregnum” began, in which there
was no elected Emperor but four elected kings. The kings were not universally accepted by
the powerful princes, and so did not rule the Empire. In this period, known as an age of
insecurity, violence and anarchy, many of the numerous city state (free and imperial cities)
emerged and political fragmentation increased further60.
(ii) 1378 was the year Emperor Charles IV died. This year marks the peak of the political
fragmentation of the Empire—a situation that was made permanent by the Golden Bull of
1356. Furthermore, while considered by some as one of the greatest and most inﬂuential
medieval German Emperors, he failed to preserve the powerful position of his dynasty, the
Luxembourgians, as he pledged away a lot of the territories under his control, in order to pay
his large debts. This further weakened central authority and helped to increase the political
fragmentation of the Empire.
(iii) 1477 was the year in which Charles the Bold, Duke of Burgundy died. With his death,
the Duchy of Burgund, one of the largest states in Europe, which could be considered an
independent, middle-sized power (although de jure part of the HRE), collapsed and was
split after violent hostilities. Some parts of the Duchy fell to France and the remainder was
integrated into the HRE as smaller political entities (like the Duchy of Brabant). Furthermore,
through marriage, the Habsburgs gained control over the remaining parts of Burgundy and
thus, the death of Charles the Bold was the decisive event in the ascent of the House of
Habsburg to world power. A period with slowly declining political fragmentation began.
60Political fragmentation in the 13th century was already much higher than during the 12th century. This was due to the
fact that, as a consequence of the struggle between Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony and Emperor Frederick I., the old and
quite large stem duchies (“Stammesherzogtümer”) were dissolved and partitioned into smaller (and even further divisible)
territories. This should have weakened the position of dukes and princes towards the Emperor and hence strengthen
central power, but in the long-run, had the opposite effect.
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(iv) 1556, the year after the peace of Augsburg settled the confessional division of Germany for the
next decades and ended the ﬁrst wave of religious wars in the Holy Roman Empire. However,
it also was the year when Charles V, probably the most powerful European monarch after
the fall of Rome, abdicated from the throne due to his setback against the protestant princes
and his lack of loyal vassals within the Empire. His reign marked the peak and turning point
of the power of the House of Habsburg as his resignation from the throne and its defeat by
the princes of the Empire was the starting point of the slow decline of the Habsburg’s power.
(v) 1648, the year when the Thirty Years War ended, with the Peace Treaties of Westphalia. This
lead to notable territorial changes, as some large and powerful states like Brandenburg or
Hesse integrated smaller territories into their states. Furthermore, several imperial cities
disappeared, becoming part of France or of Switzerland (whose independence was ofﬁcially
acknowledged). Finally, it settled the confessional question within the Empire.
(vi) (vi) 1789, the year when the French Revolution began and triggered a series of events and
wars, resulting in the demise of the HRE and the most signiﬁcant reshaping of the landscape
of states in Central Europe since the dissolution of the stem duchies in the 12th century.
A.1.4. De Facto vs. de Jure Independence of States in the Maps
City states are often among those territories for which it was not absolutely clear what degree
of independence they had, regardless of their de jure status. It is well known that some cities
had gained certain independence from their rulers, while never being ofﬁcially considered as
imperial cities. By the same measure, there were imperial cities that were never truly independent
of their former ruler although they were granted “Reichsunmittelbarkeit” by the Emperor. We
consulted standard sources on the history of German cities such as Köbler (1988) or Keyser and
Stoob (1939–1974) and other studies on imperial cities, including Cantoni (2012) and followed their
judgement about whether a city was de facto, and not just de jure, an imperial city. This is also an
issue for several territories that were ruled by the Emperor or another high-ranked noble (like an
elector) but where never part of their core territory. Two of these territories were the magraviates
of Ober- and Niederlausitz (Upper and Lower Lusatia). Hence, some historians argue that the
iv
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power of those rulers over the territory was limited if non-existent. Therefore, we decided to treat
the Lausitz territories as independent states.
A.1.5. Coding Example of a Difﬁcult Case
A difﬁcult of a different case to code is the county of Sponheim which consisted at the beginning of
the 14th century, of two separated territories, the “Vordere” and “Hintere” Grafschaft of Sponhein.
When the dynasty ruling the “Vordere Grafschaft” (the front county) died out, one ﬁfth of the
County went to the Electoral Palatinate and four ﬁfth to the Count controlling the “Hintere
Grafschaft” (the back county). After 1437, the Margrave of Baden and the Count of Veldenz
inherited both parts of the County. Both rulers decided not to split the County but to rule it
together as a condominium. Another change occurred in 1559, when the Princedom of Pfalz-
Simmern (who had inherited the part of the County of Veldenz) bought the Electoral Palatinate’s
shares in the “Vordere Grafschaft”. Simultaneously, it decided to give away the half of the “Hintere
Grafschaft” to the Duchy of Pfalz-Zweibrücken. This resulted in the following situation: the
“Vordere Grafschaft” belonged three ﬁfths to Pfalz-Simmern (since 1559 Electoral Palatinate) and
two ﬁftha to Baden. The “Hintere Grafschaft” belonged half to Baden and half to Zweibrücken.
Finally, in 1707, the Margraviate of Baden-Baden and Electoral Palatinate split up the “Vordere
Grafschaft” and in 1776, the “Hintere Grafschaft” was split in half by the Margrave of Baden
and the duke of Pfalz-Zweibrücken. After 1815 the territory was integrated into Prussia and
disappeared. In 1477 and 1555, i.e. during the condominium, we decided to consider the whole
territory as county of Sponheim. Wolff, in his 1556 map has assigned the four separate territories
of the county to either Pfalz-Simmern or Baden-Baden, Pfalz-Zweibrücken and the Electoral
Palatinate. One cannot be sure whether he has assigned it to Pfalz-Simmern or Baden-Baden as
both have the same color. In addition, this does not reﬂect the actual situation in 1556 (according
to our sources), rather this is the situation in 1559 (when one assumes that he has assigned the
“Vordere Grafschaft” to Baden and not to Pfalz-Simmern). For 1648 and 1789 we follow Wolff,
who no longer included the county of Sponheim but assigned its territory to Pfalz-Zweibrücken,
Electoral Palatinate and Baden-Baden (or Baden, respectively).
v
Origins of State Capacity
A.2. Control Variables
The spatial datasets were each converted into WGS 1984 UTM 32N projection. State type and
"State in 1150" dummies are calculated from the shapeﬁles of Wolff’s maps (1877). This is also
the case for the variable “Outer Boundary” reporting the share of a states’ border that is an outer
boundary of the HRE.
Area Types. We have computed the (natural logarithm of the) area within each state that consisted
of forests, swamps and ﬂoodplains (in m2) in the pre-modern period and hence was very likely
not settled or used for agricultural purposes. Floodplains and swamps might also have played a
role as source of germs and diseases. Data is taken from a map by Schlüter (1952) that we have
digitized. His map only covers the area of contemporary Germany.
Average Terrain Ruggedness. Following Riley et al. (1999) average ruggedness of a states’ territory is
calculated as the negative value of the derivative of the ruggedness index of a digital elevation
model. The calculations are based on the elevation raster of Nunn and Puga (2012) (see above).
Terrain ruggedness was calculated using QGIS.
Average Temperature. Historical average temperature for a state is taken from the data set of Guiot
and Corona (2010). They constructed a grid cell database of historical European temperatures
and their deviations from the average temperature in 1960–1990. We use this data set to calculate,
for each state, the average temperature deviation in the period from 800 to 1378. To calculate the
average temperature deviations for each grid we follow the interpolation procedure of Anderson
et al. (2016) by ﬁlling in missing values with the inverse distance weighted average temperature of
the twenty-four nearest neighbor grid points.
Battles. Number of battles per km2 that have taken place in a state in the period between two
of our maps (e.g. between 800 and 1250 between 1250 and 1378, between 1378 and 1477 etc.).
Information of the date and location of the battles is taken from Bradbury (2004), Clodfelter (1992)
and Darby and Fullard (1978).
Distance to City State. Distance to city states is calculated as follows: Points with random location
were generated until 1,000 points fell in into each state. In a second step, the Euclidean distance
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from each of the 1,000 points per state to the closest Imperial city was calculated. In a last step,
these distances were aggregated by state. The location of city states follows the maps of Wolff
(1877) but we have corrected/ supplemented them—if necessary—with information from Köbler
(1988), Keyser and Stoob (1939–1974) and Jacob (2010).
Distance to Major Rivers. Distance to major rivers is calculated as follows: Points with random
location were generated until 1,000 points fell in into each state. In a second step, the Euclidean
distance from each of the 1,000 points per state to the to the closest major river (see Figure A.5) was
calculated. In a last step, these distances were aggregated by state. For the location of the rivers,
we used the dataset for ’WISE large rivers’ shapeﬁle, which can be downloaded here:  
	
	
										 (last accessed
May, 30th 2016).
Distance to Natural Resources. We have calculated seven variables reporting the distance to natural
resources (copper, gold, iron, lead, potassium salt, rock salt and silver). Distance to natural
resources is calculated as follows: Points with random location were generated until 1,000 points
fell in into each state. In a second step, the Euklidean distance from each of the 1,000 points per
state to the closest deposit of the respective natural resource was calculated. In a last step, these
distances were aggregated by state. The location of natural resource deposits is taken from Frenzel
(1938) and Elsner (2009).
Distance to Roman Roads. Distance to (minor and major) Roman roads is calculated as follows:
Points with random location were generated until 1,000 points fell in into each state. In a second
step, the Euclidean distance from each of the 1,000 points per state to the to the closest Roman
road was calculated. These distances were aggregated by state. Locations of Roman roads (minor
and major) originate from a shapeﬁle included in the “Digital Atlas of Roman and Medieval
Civilizations” (McCormick et al., 2013). The shapeﬁle is based on the map of Roman roads
in the Barrington Atlas of the Greek and Roman World (Talbert, 2000). It can be downloaded
here:  	 		
 		!"!#$ (last
accessed September, 24th 2015).
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Distance to Medieval Trade Road. Distance to medieval trade routes is calculated as follows: Points
with random location were generated until 1,000 points fell in into each state. The Euklidean
distance from each of the 1,000 points per state to the to the closest medieval trade route was
calculated. In a last step, these distances were aggregated by state. Location of trade routes are
obtained by digitizing a map on “Medieval Commerce” from Shepherd (1923). The map can
be downloaded as pdf from here:  	
 

	  

	 (last accessed July, 10th 2017).
Distance to Trade Fairs. Distance to trade fair is calculated as follows: Points with random location
were generated until 1,000 points fell in into each state. The Euclidean distance from each of
the 1,000 points per state to the to the closest trade fair city was calculated. These distances
were aggregated by state. The locations of the fairs were taken from Ditchburn and Mackay
(2002).
Maximum Elevation. Maximum elevation of each state in meters. Data is based on the Digital
Elevation Model (DEM) of the U.S. Geological Survey’s Center for Earth Resources Observation
and Science (EROS), namely the GTOPO30 dataset, which can be downloaded here  
	 (last accessed May, 30th 2016). The GTOPO30 has a spatial resolution
of 30 arc seconds.
Plough Suitability. Plough suitability of a states’ soils are measured by the share of its area
which has luvisol soils. Data on location of luvisol soils is taken from the European Soil
Database version 2 provided by the European Soil Data Center (ESDAC). We used the 1km*1km
raster data set downloadable here (upon request):  
 
	  !  	
" #$#$ (last accessed June, 20th 2017).
Pre-Historic Settlement Area. We have computed the (natural logarithm of the) area within each
state that was already settled in pre-historic times (in m2). This information stems from Schlüter
(1952).
Latitude. Minimum longitudinal coordinates a states’ centroid (mid-point) in meters. Calculated
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using QGIS.
Longitude. Minimum longitudinal coordinates of a states’ centroid (mid-point) in meters. Calcu-
lated using QGIS.
Relative Cereals Suitability. An index of caloric suitability of cereals relative to roots and tubers for
each states was generated according to the logic of Mayshar et al. (2015) using data from Galor
and Özak (2015). This index measures the difference between the maximum yield from plants that
are appropriable, and the maximum yield from roots and tubers. Appropriable plants (“cereals”)
included alfalfa, banana, barley, buckwheat, cabbage, canary grass, chickpea, citrus, coconut, cow
pea, dry pea, ﬂax, foxtail millet, greengram, indigo rice, jatropha, miscanthus, oat, oil palm, olive,
pasture grass, pasture legumes, pearl millet, pigeon pea, pulses, rape, rye, sorghum (subtropical),
sorghum (tropical highland), sorghum (tropical lowland), soybean, spring barley, spring wheat,
sugar cane, tea, wetland rice, wheat, winter barley, winter rye, and winter wheat. Roots and tubers
were carrot, groundnut, onion, yams, and white yam.
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Table A.1: Descriptive Overview of the Data Set
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Area 1,925 2250000000.000 8470000000.000 4948171.000 193000000000.000
Average Temperature 1,925 0.150 0.054 -0.011 0.355
Battles per km2 1,925 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.015
Belgium 1,925 0.040 0.196 0.000 1.000
Caloric Observability 1,925 399.880 475.622 0.000 4160.717
COI Post-1500-COI Pre-1500 1,925 3619.769 181.221 2145.383 4284.983
County 1,925 0.265 0.442 0.000 1.000
CSI Post-1500-CSI Pre-1500 1,925 1474.386 181.221 0.000 2139.601
Czech Republic 1,925 0.010 0.101 0.000 1.000
Distance to Copper Deposit 1,925 136088.000 62582.970 8989.408 394265.800
Distance to Gold Deposit 1,925 93655.510 70641.920 0.000 457256.300
Distance to Imperial City 1,925 65288.080 93232.030 0.000 509783.900
Distance to Iron Deposit 1,925 79611.300 54619.310 0.000 377603.900
Distance to Large River 1,925 33.660 23.005 0.888 143.924
Distance to Lead Deposit 1,925 116992.100 63723.760 8277.119 441320.800
Distance to Potassium Salt Deposit 1,925 121460.000 96965.100 0.000 597686.800
Distance to Rock Salt Deposit 1,925 130085.100 86606.360 18.912 376318.100
Distance to Roman Road 1,925 81.126 118.883 0.650 656.984
Distance to Silver Deposit 1,925 397472.600 140633.700 18386.710 810327.000
Distance to Trade Fair 1,925 231385.200 131436.600 3159.897 843413.800
Distance to Trade Route 1,925 45.722 37.628 1.169 236.214
Duchy 1,925 0.063 0.244 0.000 1.000
Ecclesiastical State 1,925 0.202 0.401 0.000 1.000
Electorate 1,925 0.025 0.158 0.000 1.000
France 1,925 0.081 0.272 0.000 1.000
Germany 1,925 0.707 0.455 0.000 1.000
Herrschaft 1,925 0.161 0.368 0.000 1.000
Hungary 1,925 0.001 0.032 0.000 1.000
Italy 1,925 0.008 0.088 0.000 1.000
Kindom 1,925 0.002 0.046 0.000 1.000
Lithuania 1,925 0.001 0.023 0.000 1.000
ln(Area) 1,925 20.067 1.650 15.415 25.988
ln(Caloric Observability Post-1500) 1,925 5.768 0.885 0.000 8.078
ln(Caloric Observability) 1,925 2.832 1.007 0.000 8.334
ln(Caloric Suitability Post-1500) 1,925 7.266 0.637 0.000 7.786
ln(Caloric Suitability) 1,925 7.431 0.679 0.000 7.897
ln(Floodplains) 990 2.069 6.712 0.000 23.821
ln(Forest Area) 990 6.220 8.415 0.000 17.594
ln(Optimal Caloric Observability) 1,924 6.662 0.975 0.000 9.716
ln(Optimal Caloric Suitability) 1,925 8.947 0.638 0.000 9.430
ln(Pre-Historic Settlement) 990 9.092 8.736 0.000 17.477
ln(Settled Area) 827 19.122 1.313 12.666 22.857
ln(Swamp Area) 990 2.145 6.666 0.000 22.836
Luxemburg 1,925 0.002 0.046 0.000 1.000
Margraviate 1,925 0.017 0.128 0.000 1.000
Maximum Elevation 1,925 767.721 766.672 5.000 4366.000
Netherlands 1,925 0.020 0.139 0.000 1.000
Outer Boundary 1,925 0.047 0.137 0.000 0.890
Poland 1,925 0.034 0.181 0.000 1.000
Princedom 1,925 0.054 0.225 0.000 1.000
Relative Cereals Suitability 1,925 17279.220 3039.148 0.000 20795.540
Republic 1,925 0.018 0.134 0.000 1.000
Share of Luvisol Soils 1,925 4.085 2.577 0.027 16.823
Slovenia 1,925 0.009 0.096 0.000 1.000
Switzerland 1,925 0.067 0.250 0.000 1.000
Terrain Ruggedness 1,925 112.777 141.549 2.212 858.629
Territories 1,925 1.722 1.755 1.000 21.000
x
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A.3. Failure of States
(a) Territories missing in 1378 (b) Territories missing in 1477
(c) Territories missing in 1556 (d) Territories missing in 1648
(e) Territories missing in 1789
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Note: The data on the failure of the states was collected from Köbler (1988) and completed from other sources on regional history
Figure A.3: Failed states
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A.4. Geographic Controls
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Note: Data on Roman Road was taken from McCormick et al. (2013), medeval trade routes were digitztized from Shepherd (1923). Trade
fairs were digitized using modern positions and the towns from Ditchburn and Mackay (2002).
Figure A.4: Roman & Medieval Roads, Trade Fairs, and Hanseatic Towns
Table A.2: Inclusion of the trade fairs
Name 1250 1378 1477 1555 1648 1789
Antwerp –     
Bar sur Aube   – – – –
Bergen ob Zoom –  – – – –
Bozen – –    
Bruges      
Chalons sur Saone   – – – –
Frankfurt –     
Friedberg –  – – – –
Geneva –     
Lagny   – – – –
Leipzig – –    
Lille      
Lyon –     
Provins   – – – –
Skanes      
St. Denis      
Troyes   – – – –
Ypres      
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Note: Accessible via (last accessed May, 30th
2016)
Figure A.5: Large and Small Rivers
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Note: These data were digitized from Frenzel (1938) and Elsner (2009)
Figure A.6: Mineral Resources
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Note: Areas were digitized from Schlüter (1952).
Figure A.7: Settlement in the Early Middle Ages
Note: Own calculation on the basis of Mayshar et al. (2015) and data from Galor and Özak (2014, 2015). The lighter the colors, the higher
is suitability for growing cereals relative to growing roots and tubers.
Figure A.8: Cereals vs. Roots and Tubers
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Note: The instrument from Alesina et al. (2013) shows only minor variation within our sample. We employ the idea by Andersen et al.
(2016) based on data from Panagos (2006) and Van Liedekerke et al. (2006).
Figure A.9: Usage of the Heavy Plough Alesina et al. (2013); Andersen et al. (2016)
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Note: Information of the date and location of the battles is taken from Bradbury (2004), Clodfelter (1992) and Darby and Fullard (1978).
Figure A.10: Battles
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Note: Digitized from Wolff (1877)
Figure A.11: Regions of the HRE in 1150
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